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Medication in Moderation: A Case for Adopting 
Canada’s Limitations on Poison Pills in the U.S. 
and U.K. 
William J. Carpenter* 
Abstract: Ever since shareholder rights plans or “poison pills” were devised, 
there has been staunch disagreement about whether the measures overinsulate 
management and harm returns or whether such defenses are necessary to ensure 
shareholders get the best possible deal in a change of control transaction. Re-
sponding to a inter-provincial regulatory dispute, Canada has recently amended 
its takeover regulations to create an extended deposit period accompanied by a 
majority-tender requirement which has enhanced target-board negotiating pow-
er. This Note argues that such a change would benefit both the takeover regimes 
of both the United States and United Kingdom by making the former more take-
over friendly and the latter less so. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
“Popular opinions . . . are often true, but seldom or never the whole 
truth. . . . [E]very opinion which embodies somewhat of the portion 
of truth which the common opinion omits, ought to be considered 
precious, with whatever amount of error and confusion that truth 
may be blended.” 
J.S. Mill, On Liberty, 85–86 
Since 1983, a cold war has been fought over whether corporate boards 
may defend themselves against hostile takeovers. Law and economics 
scholars and institutional shareholders vehemently oppose defensive mech-
anisms, while other scholars, corporate attorneys, and management claim 
they must be able to delay or defeat a takeover to fulfill their fiduciary du-
ties. Regulators in the United Kingdom allow boards hardly any defensive 
tactics while the courts in the United States allow management practically 
impenetrable takeover defenses. Canadian regulators, facing regulatory di-
vergence in different provinces over the extent to which boards could adopt 
defensive measures, have renewed their role as defenders of moderation. 
They have promulgated rules with the potential not only to harmonize the 
contradictory policies among provincial regulators, but also to provide the 
United States and the United Kingdom—not to mention academics and 
practitioners—a means to achieve détente in the fight over who has control 
in a hostile takeover. In short, the Canadian Rule offers an elegant solution 
that maintains board negotiating ability while empowering shareholders. 
The most important and controversial defensive measure a board may 
employ when facing a hostile takeover is a “poison pill” or “shareholder 
rights plan.” It is a defensive measure that an American or Canadian corpo-
rate board may adopt in order to resist an acquiring entity’s efforts to gain 
control of the company in a tender offer.1 The typical pill works by provid-
ing all shareholders other than acquirer with the right to obtain more shares 
at a below-market price.2 Shareholders eagerly exercise these rights, dimin-
ishing the economic value of an acquirer’s shares and diluting the percent-
age stake the acquirer owns in the target firm.3 The poison pill prevents 
takeover by making it economically infeasible for an acquirer to buy 
enough shares to gain a controlling stake in the target corporation.4 
Part II of the Note introduces the academic debate between those who 
believe boards need shareholder rights plans to fend off hostile takeovers 
while maximizing shareholder value and those who believe that sharehold-
ers always know best when deciding to tender in a takeover bid.  Part III 
 
 1  19 AM. JUR. 2D CORPORATIONS § 2186 (2015). 
 2  Id. 
 3  Id. 
 4  Id. 
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explains the general workings of the Canadian takeover regime and how 
regulatory interventionism brought about the proposed amendments. After 
considering how the new rules benefit the Canadian system, Part IV sketch-
es the American takeover regime and highlights the doctrinal and statutory 
developments that have caused an overabundance of board discretion that 
leaves managers entrenched and shareholders with few options. The Cana-
dian rules are analyzed in the American context, and while not fully satisfy-
ing either the pro-board or pro-shareholder camps, the new rules seem to 
offer an elegant solution that maintains board negotiating ability while em-
powering shareholders. Part V considers the British takeover regime and 
offers the Canadian rules as a solution to the United Kingdom’s persistent 
problem that target boards are always in a weaker negotiating position rela-
tive to the acquirer. 
 I. JUST WHAT ARE WE FIGHTING OVER? SHAREHOLDERS 
VERSUS BOARDS 
First, a key distinction in Anglo-American corporate law: in the United 
States, United Kingdom, and Canada, a tender offer is when an acquiring 
company offers to buy shares from current shareholders with the goal of 
amassing enough shares to gain control of a company by electing new cor-
porate directors. 
This is different from the American statutory “merger” where an ac-
quiring company offers buy shares of the target after which the target will 
cease to exist as a separate corporate form. In most American jurisdictions, 
a majority of shareholders of the target corporation will need to vote on the 
transaction.5 In Canada, similar statutory transactions are called “amal-
gamations” or “plans of arrangement,” and they usually require approval by 
two-thirds of target shareholders.6 In the United Kingdom, a similar proce-
dure called a “scheme of arrangement” requires 75% target shareholder ap-
proval.7 While UK schemes of arrangement will be mentioned briefly at the 
end of this paper, the primary focus is on tender offers, and in particular 
 
 5  In a merger, the transaction is governed by Delaware General Corporate Law (“DGCL”), DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (West 2014). When considered together, subsections 251(c) and (f) provide that 
a majority of outstanding shares of a target corporation must vote to approve a merger transaction (the 
most common form of takeover). This is the most common rule. Compare MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
§ 12.02(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011) (majority vote), and CAL. CORP. CODE § 1001 (West 2014) (majority 
vote), with 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11.20(a) (2014) (two-thirds majority unless certificate of incorpora-
tion specifies otherwise). 
 6  See, e.g., Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c-44, s 183(5) (Can.); Ontario Business 
Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c B.16, s 176(4) (Can.). This paper will not discuss Canadian plans of 
arrangement because, unlike in the United Kingdom, arrangements in Canada likely cannot be used to 
accomplish takeovers. See JENNIFER PAYNE, SCHEMES OF ARRANGEMENT: THEORY, STRUCTURE AND 
OPERATION 140 (2014). 
 7  PAYNE, supra note 6, at 21. 
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hostile tender offers where the acquirer does not have the support of the tar-
get’s board of directors. Since a poison pill is the best way for a target 
board to thwart a tender offer and subsequent change of directors, it is the 
gold standard of takeover defenses. 
The poison pill was conceived following the takeover craze of the 
1970s, and academics have argued over the device’s utility (or lack thereof) 
ever since.8 What I will call the “board-centric” side seeks to insulate 
boards from “activist” shareholders “interfering” with management’s run-
ning of the company or its attempts to maximize shareholder value in any 
change of control transaction. Supporters of the board-centric view argue 
that poison pills and other takeover defenses properly protect the ability of 
the board of directors to maximize shareholder value while reducing agency 
costs.9 “Shareholder-centric” academics and financial institutions view 
board defensive measures like poison pills as merely tools used to entrench 
and enrich underperforming management.10 
 A. Corporate Boards or Bust 
Board-centric academics and corporate lawyers criticize their share-
holder-centric counterparts for overemphasizing the maximization of share-
holder value arguing that it has negative consequences for firms and the 
wider economy.11 They argue that insulating corporate boards is necessary 
to increase director sensitivity to pressure by shareholders and market forc-
es.12 Unfortunately, such outsized shareholder influence leads to excessive 
 
 8  Frank Allen & Steve Swartz, Lenox Rebuffs Brown-Forman, Adopts Defense, WALL ST. J., June 
16, 1983, at 2 (relating the details surrounding the primogenitor shareholder rights plan, the first “poison 
pill”). See also John Armour, Jack B. Jacobs, & Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Evolution Of Hostile Takeover 
Regimes In Developed And Emerging Markets, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 219, 241 (2011) (explaining the 
macroeconomic and regulatory causes of the 1970s takeover wave and the reasons why the poison pill 
emerged as America’s takeover defense of choice). 
 9  See Martin Lipton & Paul K. Rowe, The Inconvenient Truth About Corporate Governance: Some 
Thoughts on Vice-Chancellor Strine’s Essay, 33 J. CORP. L. 63, 65–66 (2007). Lipton and Rowe argue 
vociferously that shareholders have inadequate information and insufficient time to make adequately 
informed long-term investment decisions; they declaim as exaggerated the alleged “agency problem” in 
which the interests of corporate directors and shareholders impermissibly diverge, and advocate renewed 
adherence to board-centric corporate governance. To explain why Delaware courts go along with this 
view, see Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for 
Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521 (2002) (detailing a “hidden value” model of takeovers to explain 
Delaware judicial decision making regarding mergers and acquisitions). 
 10  E.g., Matthew E. Souther, The Effects of Takeover Defenses: Evidence From Closed-End Funds, 
119 J. FIN. ECON. 420, 420 (2016) (finding that in closed-end funds the use of takeover defenses nega-
tively impact firm value while financially benefitting managers). 
 11  See Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance 267 (Uni-
versity of San Diego Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-078, 2012),  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2006556. 
 12  See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY: HOW FINANCE TRIUMPHED OVER 
INDUSTRY 1–7 (2007),  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017923. 
36_3_3 CARPENTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/10/16  8:32 PM 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 36:547 (2016) 
552 
corporate risk-taking.13 Some scholars argue that this partially caused the 
Great Recession in the United Kingdom.14 Regardless, many attribute the 
ills of shareholder activism to the increasing activities of “[m]oney manager 
intermediaries constitut[ing] a supermajority of those wielding actual 
stockholder rights rather than the long-term investors whose money is actu-
ally invested.”15 In other words, board-centric academics argue that those 
voting the shares might have different interests from those who actually 
own them. 
In the context of a hostile takeover, many corporate boards are leery 
because they know that activist shareholders (like mutual funds, pension 
funds, and hedge funds) are looking to improve short-term results.16 Unfor-
tunately, the short-term strategy usually means the target company’s returns 
will suffer as value is “extracted” at the expense of long-term fiscal stabil-
ity.17 While it is true that corporate directors often make quarterly share 
price increases their top priority, directors’ self-interest in keeping the com-
pany solvent so they can keep their jobs moderates their temptation to pur-
sue short-term gains at all costs. Still, corporate directors may worry that 
without unilateral discretion to adopt a poison pill, institutional investors 
might vote to tender their shares on a whim for a quick profit even though 
the acquirer has no interest in improving the health of the target. But this is 
not the only kind of harm that target boards face from potential activist ac-
quirers. 
It is also possible that activist acquirers are not interested in maximiz-
ing shareholder value in the traditional sense. Law Professors Henry Hu of 
the University of Texas and Bernard Black of Northwestern University 
point out that money manager investors frequently hedge their investments 
in corporations with derivatives and debt-equity swaps, which allows them 
to separate their control rights from the incentives of owning equities.18 
 
 13  See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 
158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 656 (2010) (arguing that investors’ value-maximizing incentives and incomplete 
perception of risk relative to managers makes them even less able to judge the appropriateness of risk-
taking when compared with the board). 
 14  David Kershaw, The Illusion of Importance: Reconsidering the UK’s Takeover Defence Prohibi-
tion, 56 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 267, 269 (2007) (citing Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of 
Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1987)). 
 15  Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Duel-
ing Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 455–56 (2014). 
 16  See Carl Ackermann, Richard McEnally & David Ravenscraft, The Performance of Hedge 
Funds: Risk, Return, and Incentives, 54 J. FIN. 833, 834 (1999). 
 17  See Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism: A Review, 4 FOUND. & TRENDS IN FIN. 185, 222 
(2010) (finding target operating profitability declines upon acquisition and does not recover until two 
years later, if at all). 
 18  Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance 
and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 626 (2008) (describing the ways in which control and equity 
interests can be decoupled such that large shareholders benefit by exercising their control to the detri-
ment of the company and other shareholders, including during takeovers). 
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Once economic and control rights are separated, institutional investors will 
focus more on short-term rather than long-term value.19 Such investors may 
seek to take over companies for a short period of time simply to engage in 
arbitrage.20 These kinds of acquirers have motives totally divorced from 
improving shareholder value over the long term.21 Still, law and economics 
scholars favoring total shareholder control in hostile takeovers might reply 
that even if Hu and Black are correct that arbitrage and misaligned institu-
tional investor incentives pose a problem, it is not serious enough to warrant 
giving boards the power to completely insulate themselves from hostile 
takeover using shareholder rights plans.22 
In response to these arguments that the rise of institutional investors 
should justify the ability of directors to maintain a poison pill without a 
shareholder vote, law and economics scholars engage in a flanking maneu-
ver and attack a different justification for allowing boards to use poison 
pills, namely “substantive coercion.” The doctrine of substantive coercion 
posited that boards should have the ability to address the risk posed by ful-
ly-informed-but-rather-nervous shareholders mistakenly accepting a hostile 
bid that undervalued the company.23 Professors Ronald Gilson and Jeffrey 
Gordon argue that if these well-informed institutional investors and arbitra-
geurs really are as prevalent as board-centric scholars warn, then “substan-
tive coercion” should no longer pose a problem.24  Where institutional in-
vestors already hold a large stake in the target, they may have a superior 
understanding of both the target’s business prospects and the relative value 
of an offer from a hostile acquirer. In such a situation, Gilson and Gordon 
would argue that there is no danger of “substantive coercion” because the 
well-informed and experienced institutional investors are in no danger of 
“mistakenly” selling their shares. Hence, Delaware case law giving corpo-
rate boards a free hand to adopt poison pills would be called into question 
because those cases rely in part on the danger of substantive coercion as 
 
 19  Id. 
 20  See Bernard Black, Bernard S., Equity Decoupling and Empty Voting: The Telus Zero-Premium 
Share Swap (Northwestern Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 12-16, 2012), reprinted in M&A Lawyer, 
October 2012, at 1, 4–8, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2150345. 
 21  See Jordan M. Barry, et al., On Derivatives Markets and Social Welfare: A Theory of Empty Vot-
ing and Hidden Ownership 7 (Stanford Law and Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 433, Aug. 22, 2012),  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2134458. 
 22  Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism—In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 BUS. LAW. 
978, 1005–06 (2013). 
 23  Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Agency Capitalism: Further Implications of Equity Inter-
mediation 22–23 (European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Law Working Paper No. 239/2014; 
Stanford Law and Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 456; Columbia Law and Econ. Working Paper No. 46, 
Feb. 1, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2359690. 
 24  Id. See generally Usha Rodrigues, Corporate Governance in and Age of Separation of Owner-
ship from Ownership, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1822 (2010) (providing an in-depth comparison of the conflicts 
that can arise between long-term shareholders like index and pension funds to more activist short-term 
shareholders like hedge funds). 
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justification for using a shareholder rights plan.25 
Still, Gilson and Gordon do not consider the enormous agency prob-
lems identified by Hu and Black that arise when a “shareholder” holds only 
control rights and is betting against the target company in a takeover be-
cause the shareholder is in league with the hostile acquirer. Without a poi-
son pill, such phantom shareholders can and will vote in favor of a takeover 
to the detriment of all other shareholders without suffering negative eco-
nomic consequences. Indeed, Hu and Black show that decoupling control 
and equity stakes misaligns incentives so that shareholders might look to 
sell even when the share price is below what any normal shareholder would 
accept (i.e., at a price below what would be acceptable to a person holding 
both the legal and economic interests in the shares).26 As Chief Justice 
Strine puts it, “institutional investors have emerged who seem to be moti-
vated by a desire for engagement for reasons unrelated to investment val-
ue.”27 Plus, even when activist acquirers like hedge funds are interested in 
maximizing investment value, their activism imposes significant costs. 
Shareholder votes are time consuming, inefficient, and expensive—the only 
ones with the time to be activists are the intermediary money managers and 
hedge fund managers.28 
American jurists are not the only ones questioning the unbridled model 
of shareholder primacy. The idea that it may be detrimental to focus solely 
on maximizing shareholder has gained some traction in Canada and the 
United Kingdom.29 In fact, Hu and Black have a Canadian counterpart who 
wanted to use the new regulations to restrict “empty voting” and decou-
 
 25  Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum, 439 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (holding that courts may leave in 
place defensive measures like poison pills under the business judgment rule to the extent that such 
measures are “reasonable in relation to the threat posed”). 
 26  See Hu & Black, supra note 17, at 631–636 (describing the ways in which control and equity in-
terests can be decoupled such that large shareholders benefit by exercising their control to the detriment 
of the company and other shareholders, including during takeovers). 
 27  See Strine, supra note 15, at 455–56. 
 28  See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 1735, 1740 (2006) (conceding that shareholder votes on takeovers are inherently necessary but not 
indicative of some wider need to expand shareholder voting to other subjects properly and efficiently 
within the sole discretion of the board). 
 29  See Carol Liao, Corporate Governance Reform for the 21st Century: A Critical Reassessment of 
the Shareholder Primacy Model, 43 OTTAWA L. REV. 187 (2013) (arguing the law and economics 
“shareholder primacy model encourages corporate behavior that perpetuates the likelihood of future cri-
ses” and suggesting reforms to the core features of corporate structures as a solution); Michael Marin, 
Disembedding Corporate Governance: The Crisis of Shareholder Primacy in the UK and Canada, 39 
QUEEN’S L.J. 223 (2013) (arguing for corporate reform on the socialist philosophy and legal theory). 
One last point is that shareholder-centric systems, or “outsider systems,” like that of the United King-
dom, tend to make companies slightly less stable “because managers are not free to build up cash re-
serves that could help protect jobs during temporary economic downturns, because they are under con-
stant pressure to deliver short-term shareholder value.” Helen Callaghan, Economic Nationalism, 
Network-Based Coordination, and The Market for Corporate Control: Motives for Political Resistance 
to Foreign Takeovers 5 (MPIfG Discussion Paper, No. 12/10, 2012), http://hdl.handle.net/10419/67720. 
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pling.30 Canadian and American academics criticize American law and eco-
nomics scholarship for downplaying the “significant proportion of firms” 
that “experience losses as a result of hedge fund activism” and for “over-
look[ing] . . . the possibility that whatever wealth is created by hedge fund 
activism may reflect only a wealth transfer from bondholders, employees, 
or other claimants.”31 One pair of scholars went so far as to refute (if not de-
ride) Professor Bebchuk’s most recent 2014 paper as a misadventure in 
dummy variables and spurious causal inferences.32 Moreover, some Cana-
dian scholars in the “stakeholder” school of thought fiercely contest the idea 
that directors are entrenched at all, pointing to the fact that most takeover 
agreements improve share prices so substantially that directors cannot wait 
to cash in their stock options.33 This can change “hostility into a welcome 
mat,” even if it is not in best the long-term interests of investors, the com-
pany, or employees.34 
Finally, and most importantly, there is substantial evidence that being 
able to resist a hostile takeover is beneficial for shareholders. Implementing 
a shareholder rights plan forces the acquirer to pay the added value that ac-
companies gaining control of the target, the “control premium.”35 This pre-
mium is 5–10% higher when a company has adopted a poison pill.36 In oth-
er words, the bidding contest for control of the target company frequently 
“culminates in an acquisition on terms superior to the initial hostile offer.”37 
 
 30  Robert E.P. Shaw, What We Don’t Know Can Hurt Us—Ontario’s Regulation of Empty Voting 
and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 29 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 517, 519–21 (2014). 
 31  John C. Coffee & Palia Darius, The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism: Evidence and Implications 
3–4 (European Corporate Governance Institute Law Working Paper No. 266/2014; Columbia Law and 
Econ. Working Paper No. 489, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2496518. For a similarly skeptical conti-
nental European perspective, see generally Luca Eniques & Matteo Gatti, Creeping Acquisitions in Eu-
rope: Enabling Companies to Be Better Safe than Sorry (European Corporate Governance Institute Law 
Working Paper No. 264/2014; Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 69/2014, 2014),  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2492158. When researchers focused on the performance of U.K. companies 
they found “there is no clear evidence of improved post-acquisition performance.” Christian Tuch & 
Noel O’Sullivan, The Impact of Acquisitions on Firm Performance: A Review of the Evidence, 9 INT’L J. 
MGMT. REVIEWS 141, 149 (2007). 
 32  See Yvan Allaire & Francois Dauphin, “Activist” Hedge Funds: Creators of Lasting Wealth? 
What Do the Empirical Studies Really Say? 6 (July 16, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2460920. Even 
economists concede that event studies have statistical “shortcomings.” Marina Martynova & Luc 
Renneboog, A Century of Corporate Takeovers: What Have We Learned and Where Do We Stand?, 32 
J. BANKING & FIN. 2148, 2512 (2008). 
 33  Letter from Yvan Allaire, Exec. Chair of the Institute for Governance to the Ontario Securities 
Commission and Autoritê des marchés financiers regarding CSA Request for Comment on Proposed 
National Instrument 62-203 (June 26, 2013), http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-
Category6-Comments/com_20130627_62-203_insituegovprivate_en.pdf. 
 34  Id. 
 35  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 36  See John Laide, Poison Pill M&A Premiums, SHARKREPELLANT (Aug. 30, 2005), 
https://www.sharkrepellent.net/pub/rs_20050830.html. 
 37  Carmody v. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d 1180, 1186 (Del. Ch. 1998). 
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The economic benefits of rights plans for shareholders are well-recognized 
by American courts, which makes them “extremely reluctant to order the 
redemption of poison pills on fiduciary grounds.”38 
Overall, the board-centric camp has compelling arguments from expe-
rience, and their perspective is shared by most Delaware judges, if not most 
judges generally. They raise issues regarding empty voting and post-
takeover firm performance that those favoring shareholders have yet to sat-
isfactorily answer. 
 B. Shareholders Claim Primacy 
Shareholder-centric academics and institutional investors counter by 
arguing that anti-takeover measures like poison pills and classified or 
“staggered” boards merely entrench incumbent management while denying 
shareholders the opportunity to benefit from a potential takeover.39 Law and 
economics scholars concede that protecting boards from removal may help 
them attain higher acquisition premiums for shareholders,40 but they argue 
that “incumbents might use whatever additional power comes with such 
protection to extract side payments for themselves rather than higher premia 
for shareholders.”41 Additionally, Professor Lucian Bebchuk argues that 
policies insulating managers from shareholders will give them less incen-
tive to serve shareholder interests, particularly when managers know they 
can thwart any hostile takeover attempt with a poison pill, “or at least . . . 
extract a good deal for themselves.”42 Without the “disciplinary threat” of a 
takeover, Bebchuk argues, management agency costs will increase and cor-
porate performance will decrease.43 
In response to Justice Strine’s criticisms, the shareholder-centric aca-
demics—including Professor Bebchuk—have produced studies purportedly 
 
 38  Id. 
 39  See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory 
Competition, 87 VA. L. REV. 111, 113–14 (2001); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The 
Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409 (2005) (finding poison pills in combination with stag-
gered boards over-insulate directors causing a decrease in firm value); but see Michael D. Frakes, Clas-
sified Boards and Firm Value, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 113 (2007) (agreeing classified boards reduce firm 
value on average while questioning the Bebchuk’s underlying empirical methods and finding negative 
effects only among the quintile of largest firms and positive effects on firm value in the quintiles con-
taining smaller firms). 
 40  See Robert Comment & G. William Schwert, Poison or Placebo? Evidence on The Deterrence 
and Wealth Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures, 39 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 38 (1995) (finding “takeover 
premiums are higher when target firms are protected by state laws or [poison] pills suggest[ing] that the 
relative bargaining positions . . . are altered by these antitakeover devices, raising . . . gains to the tar-
get”). 
 41  See Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 37, at 415–17. 
 42  Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
973, 993 (2002). 
 43  Id. at 994. 
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showing shareholder activism does not hurt long-term returns.44 In addition, 
these scholars claim there is no evidence that institutional investors engage 
in “pump-and-dump” patterns of activism.45 Still, it is unclear whether Beb-
chuk’s study reflects situations in which equity and control stakes have 
been bifurcated. In particular, Bebchuk and his coauthors use historical 
stock price, balance sheet, cashflow, and news headlines, but it does not 
seem as though they have accounted for the kind of cash-settled equity 
swaps and derivatives that can be used to get economic ownership without 
the formal exchange or sale of securities.46 Hence, the law and economics 
scholarship may underrepresent the dangers posed by predatory acquirers 
and short-term focused arbitrageurs, which would lead scholars like Beb-
chuk to underestimate the importance of giving target boards the ability to 
resist a hostile takeover. 
Other researchers sympathetic to shareholder interests vis-à-vis boards 
take a completely different tack, positing that the “short-termism” argument 
overlooks the economic fundamentals of the U.S. market. In particular, Pro-
fessor Mark J. Roe of Harvard Law School argues that any distortions 
caused by short-termism holdings are offset by venture capital and private 
equity markets, and that high-frequency trading data has created an illusion 
that holding periods have shortened when in reality major shareholding in-
stitutions like mutual and pension funds still hold their shares for the long-
term.47 Still, Roe does not argue that short-termism is not a problem, only 
that the current level of protection afforded by American law is more than 
sufficient and that threats of short-termism should not be used to further ex-
pand board discretion.48 Roe necessarily concedes that shareholder rights 
plans must play a role in defending against investors motivated by goals 
other than maximizing investment value. 
To be sure, the body of law and economics scholarship that underlies 
the shareholder primacy model and its supporters is substantially larger than 
that of the pro-board scholars and practitioners. Still, using linear equations 
to explain complex phenomena without accounting for important differ-
ences (e.g., industry type) or data discrepancies (e.g., not correcting for 
companies that were liquidated post-takeover) does raise legitimate ques-
 
 44  Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 
115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1085 (2015). See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating 
Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637 (2013). 
 45  This refers to situations where shareholders push for increased profits or shareholder distributions 
and sell their stake before the inevitable period of abnormal negative long-term returns sets in, not to the 
fraudulent practice of making false and misleading statements to the marketplace to artificially inflate a 
microcap stock. See “Pump-and-dumps” and Market Manipulations, S.E.C. FAQ (last visited Feb. 14, 
2015), http://www.sec.gov/answers/pumpdump.htm. 
 46  See Hu & Black, supra note 18, at 635. 
 47  See Roe, supra note 22, at 1000. 
 48  Id. at 1005–06. 
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tions.49 Nevertheless, the quantity of academic research supporting share-
holder primacy tempers most assertions that correlation and causation may 
have been confused. 
 C. Charting a Third Way 
Despite each side’s assertion of a monopoly on truth, it may be the 
case that both the shareholder-centric and board-centric camps have valid 
claims, despite their dire predictions about their opponents’ policies. In-
deed, Delaware Chief Justice Leo Strine, has argued that pro-board of direc-
tors “insulation advocates” and supporters of “shareholder driven direct 
democracy” are both too extreme in their policy prescriptions.50 Justice 
Strine suggests compromise modifications to American corporate law whol-
ly satisfying to neither side of the board-shareholder academic divide; these 
changes are reminiscent of the recently amended Canadian system.51 Hence, 
it would seem appropriate to consider what lessons may be learned from the 
recently amended Canadian securities regime. 
 III. THE CANADIAN SYSTEM OF HOSTILE TAKEOVERS 
The Canadian policy on poison pills (“shareholder rights plans” or 
“SRPs”) and takeover bids has an advantage over both the British and 
American policy regimes because Canada protects shareholder choice while 
preserving management bargaining ability. With minor modification, the 
Canadian policy can be readily adapted to both the American and British 
contexts to the benefit of both systems.52 
 
 49 See Strine, supra note 15, at 461–64 . 
 50  Id. at 449. 
 51   Id. at 498–99. For instance, now-Chief Justice Strine suggests that corporate boards should be 
unclassified so that there is always less than a year before the bidder can launch a proxy fight to gain 
control of the board (which is possible even with less than fifty percent of shares because of plurality 
voting). Id. This has similar effect to the Canadian 120-day maximum length for poison pills, granted it 
is only one-third the length. Both provisions give target boards a finite period of time to negotiate with a 
determined hostile acquirer before facing a shareholder. In Canada, shareholders vote on whether to ap-
prove maintaining the poison pill, and under Strine’s rule the same thing effectively happens when the 
existing shareholders decide whether to side with the acquirer in a proxy fight (who, if victorious, will 
take control of the board and rescind the pill). 
 52  Canadian Securities Administrators, ONT. SEC. COMM’N, CSA Notice 62-306: Update on Pro-
posed National Instrument 62-105 Security Holder Rights Plans and AMF Consultation Paper An Al-
ternative Approach to Securities Regulators’ Intervention in Defensive Tactics (Sept. 11, 2013),  
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category6/rule_20140911_62-306_update-holder-
rights-plan.pdf. The Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) is a voluntary cooperative body that de-
vises consensus based policy recommendations with the goal of enactment by the independent territorial 
securities commissions. Overview, CANADIAN SECURITIES ADMINISTRATORS, http://www.securities-
administrators.ca/aboutcsa.aspx?id=45 (last visited Nov. 9, 2014). 
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 A. The Canadian Legal Apparatus: Statutes, Regulators, and 
Regulations 
The Canadian constitution constrains the federal government such that 
the Canadian securities regime is governed largely by provincial statutes 
and enforced by provincial officials.53 Unlike the American regime, which 
relies on state courts and corporate law to determine the validity of takeover 
defenses and SEC regulations to moderate certain aspects of the takeover 
process, each Canadian province has its own statute setting up an independ-
ent securities commission capable of promulgating rules and adjudicating 
disputes.54 In sharp contrast to Delaware’s hegemony over American corpo-
rate law, no single Canadian territory or province has a monopoly on incor-
porating businesses, so variations and contradictions among provincial reg-
ulators and regulations are more likely to cause friction.55 
One key feature of the Canadian system is that securities regulators 
have the power to enact a wide variety of orders if they deem it to be in the 
public interest.56 For instance, the prototypical Securities Act (Ontario), 
R.S.O. 1990, c S.5, sec 127(1), gives the Ontario Securities Commission the 
power to exercise this “public interest jurisdiction” to command, inter alia, 
that “trading in any securities by or of a person or company or that trading 
in any derivatives by a person or company cease permanently or for such 
period as is specified in the order.”57 This particular order is called a “cease 
 
 53  It is unclear whether a national scheme of securities regulation would be constitutional in Cana-
da. In an advisory opinion, the Canadian Supreme Court held that the Government’s proposed securities 
act “as presently drafted is not valid under the general branch of the federal power to regulate trade and 
commerce under s 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867.” Reference Re Securities Act, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 
837, ¶ 134 (Can.). The Court opined that “Parliament cannot regulate the whole of the securities system 
simply because aspects of it have a national dimension,” but the Court left open the possibility for a co-
operative federalism type solution while refusing to speculate as to the permissible contours of such a 
scheme. Id. ¶¶ 7–10. By most accounts, it seems Canadian securities regulation will remain at the state 
or territorial level for the foreseeable future. 
 54  In the provinces, Commissions are established unless otherwise noted: Securities Act (Alberta), 
R.S.A. 2000, c S-4, § 11 (Can.); Securities Act (British Columbia), R.S.B.C. 1996, c 418, § 4, (Can.); 
Securities Act (Manitoba), C.C.S.M. 2012, c S50, sec 2(1) (Can.); Securities Act (New Brunswick), 
S.N.B. 2004, c S-5.5, § 4 (Can.); Securities Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c S-13, § 3 (Can.) (establishing Superin-
tendent of Securities); Securities Act (Ontario), R.S.O. 1990, c S.5, sec 2.1 (Can.); Securities Act (Prince 
Edward Island), R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c S-3.1, § 13(2) (Can.) (establishing Superintendent of Securities); Act 
Respecting the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (Quebec), L.R.Q. 2004, c 37, s 90 (Can.); Securities 
Act (Saskatchewan), S.S. 1988-89, c S-42.2, § 3.1(1) (Can.). In the territories, Superintendents of Secu-
rities are appointed by their respective Finance Ministers: Securities Act (Northwest Territories), 
S.N.W.T. 2008, c 10, § 13 (Can.); Securities Act (Nunavut), S.Nu. 2008, c 12, § 13 (Can.); Securities 
Act (Yukon), SY 2007, c 16, § 13 (Can.). 
 55  See Ian C. Wildgoose Brown, Hard to Swallow: The Canadian Poison Pill from an American 
Perspective, 36 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 297, 309 (2012). 
 56  Committee for the Equal Treatment of Asbestos Minority Shareholders v. Ontario (Securities 
Commission), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 132, ¶ 39 (Can.). 
 57  FAQ, ONT. SEC. COMM’N, http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/19855.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2015). 
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trade.”58 Provincial securities regulators may issue cease trade orders 
against a company for a variety of reasons, including: failure to or tardy fil-
ing of periodic disclosures, filing deficient disclosures, or when the public 
interest requires.59 In the hostile takeover context prior to the adoption of 
the most recent amendments, if a provincial securities commission decides 
a pill is not in the public interest, then it enters a cease trade order prevent-
ing a target company’s shareholders from redeeming their share warrants or 
purchasing target stock at a discount—this has the effect of allowing the 
acquirer to buy the stock on the open market without being subject to the 
pill. 
Facing the difficulty of coordinating across ten provinces and three ter-
ritories, the various securities regulators decided to seek uniformity and 
formed a cooperative organization called the Canadian Securities Adminis-
trators (CSA).60 The CSA describes itself as an “umbrella organization of 
Canada’s provincial and territorial securities regulators whose objective is 
to improve, coordinate and harmonize regulation of the Canadian capital 
markets” through consensus policy decisions.61 Chief among these usually-
but-not-always harmonious policies is National Policy 62-202 – Takeover 
Bids – Defensive Tactics,62 which gives regulatory embodiment to the view 
that shareholders deserve the right to make a fully informed decision on an 
offer.63 While the regulators claim that “authorities appreciate that defen-
sive tactics . . . may be taken by a board of directors of a target company in 
a genuine attempt to obtain a better bid,” the National Policy 62-202 makes 
clear that “tactics that are likely to deny or limit severely the ability of the 
shareholders to respond to a take-over bid or a competing bid may result in 
action by the Canadian securities regulatory authorities.”64 As a result, Ca-
nadian regulators prefer speedy shareholder votes and auctions, and they 
 
 58  Id. 
 59  Id. See, e.g., Re KDR Industrials Ltd., 2015 ABASC 551 (Can.) (cease trade order for failure to 
file periodic audited and unaudited financial disclosures); Revocation Order, Texas South Energy Inc., 
2014 BCSECCOM 250, ¶ 1 (Can.) (company was cease traded until it filed a prospectus regarding 
planned distributions to shareholders); Re Petaquilla Minerals Ltd., 2012 BCSECCOM 442, ¶¶ 40–41 
(finding it in the public interest to cease trade a shareholder rights plan). 
 60  If you are confused, imagine a cross between the SEC and the American National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws—lots of recommendations, none of them binding, but most of 
them adopted by most states. The CSA, comprising only ten provinces and three territories in its mem-
bership, has a fairly good track record of creating uniform laws. Cf. Wildgoose Brown, supra note 53, at 
305 (pointing out that there is significant variation in the application and enforcement of the CSA policy 
recommendation even after they are enacted by each member jurisdiction). 
 61  Overview, CANADIAN SECURITIES ADMINISTRATORS, http://www.securities-
administrators.ca/aboutcsa.aspx?id=45 (last visited Nov. 9, 2014). 
 62  See, e.g., Notice of National Policy 62-202 and Recission of National Policy Statement No. 38 
Take-Over Bids – Defensive Tactics (in force as of Aug. 4, 1997), ONT. SEC. COMM’N,  
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_pol_19970704_62-202_fnp.jsp. 
 63  Id. 
 64  Id. 
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have not hesitated to intervene in takeovers to achieve those goals.65 Fur-
thermore, the Canadian Supreme Court readily defers to the judgments of 
the Securities Commissions and has asserted that the various provincial en-
actments are “clearly intended” to grant Commissions “a very wide discre-
tion,” leaving it up to them “to determine whether and how to intervene in a 
particular case.”66 
To be sure, there is no such thing as a permanent shareholder rights 
plan in Canada. They are temporary and are usually cease traded67 within 
forty-two to fifty days of adoption without shareholder approval.68 As we 
will see, however, prior to the adoption of Canada’s new amendments, 
shareholder adoption of a poison pill is no guarantee of a its continued ex-
istence either. 
 1. The Fiduciary Duties of Canadian Corporate Boards 
Before going any further, we must briefly sketch the fiduciary duties 
of corporate boards in Canada which underlie all the cases that follow. The 
Canadian Supreme Court holds that in exercising their fiduciary duty of 
care, directors must “act in the best interests of the corporation,” which 
 
 65  See Canadian Securities Administrators, Request for Comments on Proposed National Instrument 
62-105 Security Holder Rights Plans, Proposed Companion Policy 62-105CP, and Proposed Conse-
quential Amendments, [2013] 36 OSCB 2643, 2646–47 [hereinafter Proposed NI 62-105 Security Hold-
er Rights Plans], http:// www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_ni_20130314_62-105_security-holder-
rights-plan.htm. 
 66  Committee for the Equal Treatment of Asbestos Minority Shareholders v. Ontario (Securities 
Commission), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 132, ¶ 39. Note as well that where American courts have Chevron defer-
ence (Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)) for administrative statutory interpretations 
and the Universal Camera “substantial evidence” (Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 
U.S. 402 (1971)) and “hard look” (Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983)) standards of review for agency fact finding. Similarly, Canadian courts 
have Dunsmuir deference to both agency interpretations and fact. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 
SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190, ¶¶ 50–56 (Can.). Recently in McLean v. BCSC, the Canadian Supreme Court 
asserted that Dunsmuir deference is to be afforded to securities commissions, McLean v. British Colum-
bia (Securities Commission), 2013 SCC 67, ¶ 21 (reversing a lower court judgment and restoring the 
Commission’s order and its construction of § 161(6)(d) of the Securities Act, RSBC 1996, c 418) 
(Can.)). 
 67  Meaning shareholders of the target corporation would be prohibited from obtaining more free or 
discounted shares under the terms of the shareholder rights plan. 
 68  CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD 87 (2013). 
Cf. Drew Hasselback & Barbara Shecter, Regulators in Quebec, rest of Canada break logjam on poison-
pill reform, FIN. POST, Sept. 11, 2014, http://business.financialpost.com/2014/09/11/regulators-in-
quebec-rest-of-canada-break-logjam-on-poison-pill-reform/?__federated=1 (saying fifty to eighty days 
is the normal period before cease trading). Additionally, while most shareholder rights plans end or are 
cease traded prior to this point, Sec. 636(a) of the Toronto Stock Exchange Manual requires that a plan 
must be ratified by shareholders within six months of adoption. See TSX Manual, TORONTO STOCK 
EXCHANGE,  http://tmx.complinet.com/en/tsx_manual.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2014) (select “Part VI. 
Changes in Capital Structure of Listed Issuers”). 
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generally means the maximization of value of the corporation.69  The Cana-
dian Supreme Court further instructed in BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debenturehold-
ers “that in determining whether [directors] are acting with a view to the 
best interests of the corporation it may be legitimate, given all the circum-
stances of a given case, for the board of directors to consider, inter alia, the 
interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, gov-
ernments and the environment.”70 If anything, this holding seems to say that 
corporate boards can consider a wide range of interests in deciding whether 
to implement or rescind a shareholder rights plan in the face of a hostile 
takeover, and, at the very least, management should have some discretion to 
consider the short and long-term interests of the shareholders. 
To be sure, the securities commissions have taken the position that if a 
board is to use a shareholder rights plan, it may only do so to the extent that 
“the rights plan . . . facilitat[es] an auction, encourag[es] competing bids or 
otherwise maximiz[es] shareholder value.”71 Of course, the commissions 
read this policy to mean that once a rights plan is “unlikely to achieve any 
further benefits for shareholders” according to the commission, then the 
commission will cease trade the plan.72  
 2. Criteria for Regulatory Intervention to Override Corporate 
Boards That Adopt Takeover Defenses 
Cease trading is especially likely when a board adopts a poison pill in 
the face of a hostile takeover without conducting a shareholder vote, but 
there are multiple factors that the commissions consider in making their de-
terminations.73 The factors securities commissions consider in deciding 
whether to cease trade (effectively equivalent to rescindment or redemption 
in American parlance) poison pills were enunciated in Royal Host, a joint 
decision by the Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia Securities Commis-
sions.74 The commissions appreciated the difficulty of balancing the objec-
tive of National Instrument 62-203 to let shareholders decide whether to ac-
cept an offer and allowing management to act according to its perception of 
its fiduciary duty.75 Since such balancing is highly fact dependent, the 
commissions offered a nonexclusive list of factors to consider, including: 
 
 69  People’s Department Stores Inc. v. Wise, [2004] 3 R.C.S. 461, ¶ 42 (Can.). 
 70  BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, [2008] 3 R.C.S. 560, ¶¶ 80–81 (Can.) (interpreting director 
duties under the Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-44, s 122(1) (Can.)). 
 71  Re Baffinland Iron Mines Corp., [2010] 33 OSCB 11385, ¶ 26 (Can.) (emphasis added). 
 72  Id. ¶ 26 (Can.). 
 73  Re Canadian Jorex Ltd and Mannville Oil & Gas Ltd., [1992] 15 OSCB 257, 267 (Can.) (apply-
ing Royal Host factors). See also Lac Minerals Ltd. and Royal Oak Mines, [1994] 17 OSCB 4963 
(Can.). 
 74  Re Royal Host Real Estate Investment Trust, [1999] 22 OSCB 7819, ¶ 68 (Can.). 
 75  Id. 
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whether shareholder pre-approval was obtained; when the plan was adopt-
ed; the number of potential offerors and what steps, if any, the target is tak-
ing to seek more and their likelihood of success; and “the nature of the bid, 
including whether it is coercive or unfair to the shareholders of the target 
company.”76 
In applying the Royal Host factors, the Ontario Securities Commission 
has frequently reiterated that even if shareholders approve a pill: 
[A] company’s board of directors is not permitted to maintain a 
shareholders’ rights plan indefinitely in order to prevent a bid’s pro-
ceeding, but may do so as long as the board is actively seeking alter-
natives and if there is a real and substantial possibility that the board 
can increase shareholder choice and maximize shareholder value.77 
This policy ostensibly aims to put shareholders first but it disad-
vantages the target’s board; notice that the “real and substantial possibility” 
language allows the commission free reign to intervene and second guess 
the management’s business judgment about what would be best for the val-
ue of the company and the shareholders short and long-term interests. Prior 
to the adoption of the new regulations, this allowed commissions to second 
guess management’s efforts to maximize shareholder value and sometimes 
even the wishes of shareholders.  
 B. Canadian Securities Regulators Go on a Public Interest Power 
Spree 
The stage is now set for a conflict that throws the Canadian system of 
takeover regulation into a tailspin. On one side, 1976 Debentureholders’ 
says that a corporate directors’ fiduciary duties must embrace not only the 
interest of the shareholders but also those of other stakeholders including 
employees, bond holders, and the community—in other words consider 
long-term interests. On the other side, up until the adoption of this year’s 
amendments, the Canadian Securities regulators maintained that corporate 
boards must focus only on shareholder wealth maximization, and regulatory 
decisions demonstrated that this wealth maximization was paramount even 
if it was detrimental of long-term interests and stakeholders. 
Consider 1976 Debentureholders seemed to allow for corporate boards 
to wait out a hostile takeover if they believed the company could provide 
more value to shareholders (and other stakeholders) long-term as an inde-
pendent entity, even though the waiting game was not in the short-term in-
 
 76  Id. ¶ 58. 
 77  See Re Chapters Inc. and Trilogy Retail Enterprises L.P., [2001] 24 OSCB 1657, 1659 (citing 
Re MDC Corporation and Regal Greetings & Gifts Inc., [1994] 17 OSCB 4971), 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/Proceedings_rad_20010316_chap_312.htm (Can.). 
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terests of the shareholders. The securities commissions went through the 
motions of balancing these considerations, frequently opining “the chal-
lenge we face is finding the appropriate balance between permitting the di-
rectors to fulfill their duty to maximize shareholder value in the manner 
they see fit and protecting the right of the shareholders to decide whether to 
tender their shares to the bid.”78 Nevertheless, regulators were only willing 
to wait forty to fifty-five days before cease trading a shareholder rights plan 
even if the board of directors had legitimate reasons for delaying or defeat-
ing a takeover (i.e., better prospects of long-term returns for shareholders 
or).79 Even if the target’s shareholders voted to approve of a poison pill, 
which is the clearest possible indication shareholders do not want to seek 
short-term gains, the commission still cease traded the pills. The commis-
sions were second guessing shareholder decisions about what was in their 
own best interest (both in the long and short term).80 
There were multiple instances where securities commissions dispensed 
with shareholder-approved poison pills. For instance, the Alberta Securities 
Commission (ASC) second guessed shareholders facing a hostile takeover 
in 1478860 Alberta Ltd. v. Canadian Hydro Developers (“Canadian Hy-
dro”).81 A year prior to the uninvited takeover offer, 72% of Canadian Hy-
dro’s shareholders had voted to adopt a poison pill.82 When the acquirer 
sought to cease trade Canadian Hydro’s pill, Canadian Hydro’s board 
pointed out that it was actively pursuing alternative bidders and that the bid 
was “inadequate” and “opportunistic.”83 Applying the Royal Host factors,84 
the ASC initially allowed Canadian Hydro’s pill to remain in place and then 
inexplicably reversed itself sixty days later. By cease-trading the Canadian 
Hydro’s shareholder rights plan the ASC essentially told the board of Cana-
 
 78  Re Royal Host Real Estate Investment Trust, [1999] 22 OSCB 7819, ¶ 68 (Can.). 
 79  See, e.g., Re Baffinland Iron Mines Corp., [2010] 33 OSCB 11385, ¶ 26 (Can.). 
 80  The American approach could not be more different. The Delaware Supreme Court has flatly 
rejected this kind of searching review “under Unocal . . . because it would involve the court in substitut-
ing its judgment for what Is a ‘better’ deal for that of a corporation’s board of directors.” Paramount 
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989). 
 81  See Re 1478860 Alberta Ltd., 2009 ABASC 448 (Can.). 
 82  Id. ¶¶ 16, 31. 
 83  Id. ¶ 32. 
 84  As a reminder, these include: 
[W]hether shareholder approval of the rights plan was obtained; when the plan was adopt-
ed; whether there is broad shareholder support for the continued operation of the plan; the 
size and complexity of the target company; the other defensive tactics, if any, implemented 
by the target company; the number of potential, viable offerors; the steps taken by the target 
company to find an alternative bid or transaction that would be better for shareholders; the 
likelihood that, if given further time, the target company will be able to find a better bid or 
transaction; the nature of the bid, including whether it is coercive or unfair to the sharehold-
ers of the target company; the length of time since the bid was announced and made; the like-
lihood that the bid will not be extended if the rights plan is not terminated. 
Royal Host Real Estate Investment Trust, [1999] 22 OSCB 7819, ¶ 58 (emphasis added) (Can.). 
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dian Hydro that using the tools the shareholders provided was somehow a 
violation of fiduciary duty despite the fact that 1976 Debentureholders 
broader conception of fiduciary duty should have allowed the board to look 
to long-term shareholder wealth maximization.85 
Then, without warning, the ASC and Ontario Securities Commission 
(OSC) seemed to reverse course by deciding cases whose outcomes could 
only be explained if the ASC and OSC were allowing corporate directors to 
fulfill their fiduciary duties as conceived in 1976 Debentureholders. First, 
in Re Pulse Data Inc., the ASC applied the Royal Host factors and allowed 
the target corporation to fend off an unsolicited takeover bid with a poison 
pill because the board sought and obtained the informed approval from 98% 
of shareholders and even though there were not “imminent” alternative bid-
ders on the horizon.86 Subsequently, in Re Neo Material Technologies Inc, 
81% of a target corporation’s shareholders approved a poison pill in the 
face of an open offer by a hostile acquirer and the OSC upheld the pill.87 It 
opined that shareholder approval of a poison pill should indicate the pill is 
in “the bona fide interest of a target’s shareholders”88 and that  “shareholder 
rights plans may be adopted for the broader purpose of protecting the long-
term interests of the shareholders, where, in the directors’ reasonable busi-
ness judgment, the implementation of a rights plan would be in the best in-
terests of the corporation.”89 It appeared as though the ASC and OSC were 
allowing corporate directors to just say no to hostile takeovers, right in line 
with Canadian Supreme Court precedent regarding long-term interests. 
The doctrinal harmony was not to last. In Lions Gate Entertainment 
Corp., a majority of the British Columbia Securities Commission (“BCSC”) 
cease traded a rights plan recently approved by an informed majority of Li-
ons Gate shareholders because the pill was not in the public interest.90 Then 
the OSC essentially reversed its own holding in Neo stating that the target 
board’s views on what was in the best interests of the company was merely 
a “secondary consideration,” which  the Canadian corporate law community 
into angst and confusion over whether boards could consider long-term in-
terests without being second-guessed by regulators acting at the behest of a 
minority of shareholders who preferred to pursue short-term profit. 
 C. Old Habits Dying Hard: Regulators Forced to Propose New 
Solutions 
Given the regulatory uncertainty, boards and their counsel became un-
 
 85  BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, [2008] 3 R.C.S. 560, ¶¶ 80–81 (emphasis added) (Can.). 
 86  Re Pulse Data Inc., 2007 ABASC 895, ¶ 102 (Can.). 
 87  Re Neo Materials Technologies Inc., [2009] 32 OSCB 6941, ¶¶ 26–27 (Can.). 
 88  Id. ¶ 69. 
 89  Id. ¶ 112. 
 90  Re Lions Gate Entertainment Corp, 2010 BCSECCOM 432, ¶ 47 (Can.). 
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sure of the extent to which they could rely on a poison pill to fend off hos-
tile bidders even when they had secured shareholder approval. In addition, 
the economic climate had deteriorated, and there was tremendous senti-
ment—particularly in Quebec—that Canadian companies were too easily 
acquired and that boards had insufficient tools to fight back.91 (Even as this 
Note goes to print the weakness of the Canadian dollar makes Canadian 
companies ripe for the picking.92) This was a view shared by some Canadi-
an academics and Canadian law firms.93 Some commentators opposed the 
role of regulators in takeovers because “by forcing companies to abandon 
takeover defenses after arbitrary periods of time, regulators leave share-
holders vulnerable not just to hostile bidders but to unexpected turns of 
fate.”94 
The perceived problems with the system were so severe that Quebec 
was threatening to break ranks with the other provinces to prevent a “hol-
lowing out of corporate Canada” by enacting measures to allow “just say 
no” defenses.95 In other words, Quebec was unaccountably demanding to be 
more American, adopting the position that boards should have the ability to 
unilaterally maintain poison pills in the face of hostile takeovers. Even the 
former chairman of the Ontario Securities Commission, Mr. Edward 
Waitzer, was on board with the idea, arguing securities commissions should 
stop policing shareholder rights plans (and let courts decide) because the 
commissions “left Canadian firms largely helpless in the face of U.S. activ-
ist investors and hedge funds” and because “nobody really knows what the 
law is now.”96 Perhaps the strength of the reaction can be partially ex-
plained by an overreaction to dashed expectations that Neo and Pulse’s 
 
 91  See e.g., Nicolas Van Praet, ‘Takeovers are Coming’: Some of Quebec’s Biggest Companies 
Seem Vulnerable to Foreign Bids, FIN. POST (Nov. 27, 2012, 9:26 PM), 
http://business.financialpost.com/2012/11/27/takeovers-are-coming-some-of-quebecs-biggest-
companies-vulnerable-to-foreign-bids/ (raving that “half of Quebec’s 50 biggest publicly traded compa-
nies are vulnerable to foreign takeover attempts” and advocating for protectionist anti-takeover policies); 
Alexander Schmitt, Why Are Activist Investors Drawn to Canada, MONDAQ (May, 28, 2014), 
http://www.mondaq.com/canada/x/316674/Shareholders/Why+Are+Activist+Investors+Drawn+To+Can
ada. 
 92  Blake’s Mergers & Acquisitions Group, Legal Trends 2016: Mergers & Acquisitions, MONDAQ, 
Apr. 4, 2016, Factiva, Doc. No., BBPUB00020160404ec44000e6 (forecasting that foreign acquirers 
would be able to “scoop up Canadian assets at bargain prices”). 
 93  See Barbara Shecter, Poison pill creator notes differences in Canada-U.S. style, FIN. POST, Oct. 
9, 2013, at FP2 (quoting M&A panelists remarks that directors should have more leeway in their ability 
to resist a deal, rather than be driven solely by share price premia, and that there is a “serious vacuum” 
in the rules surrounding takeovers in Canada). 
 94  Adrian Myers, Regulators should get out of takeovers, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto Can.), June 12, 
2014, at B6, 2014 WLNR 15831126. 
 95  Jeff Gray, Quebec Looks at Going it Alone on Poison Pills, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto Can.), Mar. 
15, 2013, at B3, 2013 WLNR 6465284. 
 96  Jeff Gray, Putting the Poison Back in the Pill, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto Can.), Sept. 7, 2011, at 
B8, 2011 WLNR 17654567. 
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board-friendly holdings were here to stay,97 but regardless of the cause, Ca-
nadian regulators were taking fire from all sides. 
To address all these problems, including the massive inefficiencies 
created by chronic uncertainty and Quebec’s proposal to import the Ameri-
can “just say no” rule into its takeover regulations,98 the Canadian Securi-
ties Administrators drafted amendments to National Instruments 62-203 and 
62-105, which respectively regulate takeover bidding and the use of share-
holder rights plans (SRPs). These draft amendments were altered slightly 
following notice and comment, and they received ministerial approval on 
May 5, 2016.99 There are three key changes. 
First, the deposit period is increased from 35 to 105 days unless the 
target board waives the requirement or announces an alternative transac-
tion.100 Second, the offeror (acquirer, i.e., bidder) cannot take up deposited 
securities in a take-over bid unless “more than 50% of the outstanding secu-
rities of the class that are subject to the bid, excluding securities beneficially 
owned, or over which control or direction is exercised, by the offeror or by 
any person acting jointly or in concert with the offeror, have been deposited 
under the bid.”101 Third, once these conditions are met, the offeror must 
give shareholders who have not yet tendered their shares an additional ten 
 
 97  See James C. Davies, Toward a Theory of Revolution, 27 AM. SOC. REV. 5, 6–7 (1962). Davies 
posits that revolutions occur when there is a period of positive development where needs (economic, 
social, or political) are satisfied at or beyond expectations, followed by a short period of sharp reversal 
where community needs and expectations continue to grow as before but are increasingly unfulfilled. Id. 
at 6. In our case, Neo and Pulse might have built up expectations that corporate boards might have the 
means to fight off a burgeoning wave of M&A activity in Canada, only to have those expectations come 
crashing down again. See Jeff Gray, Why targets could get harder to swallow, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto 
Can.), Feb. 17, 2010, at B8 (discussing Neo Materials and whether it could signal a move toward allow-
ing boards more discretion in adopting poison pills). Dashed expectations may well have forced regula-
tory action. 
 98  In other words, Quebec was threatening to enact a regulation that gave board’s total discretion to 
adopt or rescind a poison pill without shareholder approval. See generally Consultation Paper: An Al-
ternative Approach to Securities Regulators’ Intervention in Defensive Tactics, AUTORITÉ DES 
MARCHÉS FINANCIERS (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.lautorite.qc.ca/files/pdf/consultations/juin-
2013/2013mars14-avis-amf-62-105-cons-publ-en.pdf (weighing in against the ability of regulators to 
“cease trade” poison pills that had garnered majority shareholder approval). Of course, shareholders de-
siring to tender their shares could always vote to replace the anti-takeover board members in a proxy 
fight, but that is an expensive and time consuming option.  
 99  Notice of Ministerial Approval of Amendments to Take-Over Bid Regime and Early Warning 
System, 39 OSCB 4187, 4187 (May 5, 2016), https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-
Category6/ni_20160505_62-104_amd-take-over-bids.pdf. 
 100 Changes to National Policy 62-203, Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids § 2.10, 39 OSCB 4275, 
4275 (May 5, 2016); see generally CSA Notice of Amendments to Take-Over Bid Regime – Amendments 
to Multilateral Instrument 62-104 Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids and Changes to National Policy 62-
203 Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids and Consequential Amendments, 39 OSCB (Supp-1) (Feb. 25, 
2016), http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category6/csa_20160225_62-104_amd-take-
over-bids.pdf. 
 101 National Instrument 62-104, Takeover Bids and Issuer Bids § 2.29.1, 39 OSCB 4228, 4242 (May 
5, 2016), http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-OSCB/20160505_oscb_3918_toc.pdf. 
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days to do so.102 Of course, these new take-over regulations only apply 
“where the securities subject to the offer to acquire, together with the offe-
ror’s securities, constitute in the aggregate 20% or more of the outstanding 
securities” of the target.103 
One suggested reform that did not make it into the final regulations 
provided that a non-exempt104 “bidder and its joint actors are excluded from 
the shareholder vote required to adopt, maintain, amend or terminate a 
Rights Plan.”105 This would have meant that a bidder would be unable to 
launch a proxy fight to gain control of the board or rescind a pill. Despite 
this omission, the three key changes are sufficient to bring clarity and bal-
ance to the Canadian hostile takeover regime. 
Indeed, the 105-day deposit period means negotiating power shifts to-
wards the target since bidders must secure financing for the entire period, 
leaving the target increased opportunity to pursue alternative friendly trans-
actions, decreasing the likelihood hostile takeovers will succeed,106 and in 
the energy sector this extended deposit period is particularly target-friendly 
since it means that the acquirer will have to worry about exposure to drops 
in commodity prices for a much longer period of time.107 
More generally, the amendments provide for shareholder self-
determination while giving boards more time to negotiate and largely elim-
inating the uncertainty caused by the arbitrary exercise of regulatory public 
interest jurisdiction after forty-five to seventy days depending on regulatory 
whim.108 Unless the target “engages in conduct that undermines the princi-
ples underlying the Proposed [now final] Rule or there is a public interest 
rationale for the intervention not contemplated” by the Rules, securities 
regulators will in all likelihood not reach the question of whether a pill must 
 
 102 Id. § 2.31.1, 39 OSCB 4228, 4243. 
 103 Id. § 1.1, 39 OSCB 4228, 4230. 
 104 Exempt bids are for, among other things, friendly transactions where the board consents to the 
takeover; non-exempt bids are the kind that must be made to all shareholders, like hostile takeover bids. 
See Securities Act, Multilateral Instrument 62-104 Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids, § 4. 
 105 See Canadian Securities Administrators, Proposed NI 62-105 Security Holder Rights Plans, su-
pra note 65, at 2653. 
 106 Jason A. Saltzman, Canadian Securities Administrators Amend Take-Over Bid Rules, Mondaq, 
Apr. 15, 2016, Factiva, Doc. No., BBPUB00020160415ec4f000bu. 
 107 New Takeover Rules Limiting Poison Pills Will Make it Harder to Bring Hostile Bids, 
NATIONAL POST: LEGAL POST (Mar. 1, 2016, 3:03 PM), http://business.financialpost.com/legal-
post/new-takeover-rules-limiting-poison-pills-will-make-it-harder-to-bring-hostile-bids. Companies 
have already started to take advantage of their newfound negotiating leverage. See, e.g., Dow Jones In-
stitutional News, Press Release: UrtheCast Announces Adoption of Shareholder Rights Plan, Apr. 6, 
2016, Factiva, Doc. No., DJDN000020160406ec46001au; ENP Newswire, Bear Creek Mining Board 
Approves Adoption of Shareholder Rights Plan, Apr. 25, 2016, Factiva, Doc. No., 
ENPNEW0020160425ec4p000du. 
 108 Sean Vanderpol & Edward Waitzer, Regulators Restrain a “Public Interest” Push on Poison 
Pills, FP COMMENT (Mar. 8, 2016, 4:14 PM), http://business.financialpost.com/fp-comment/regulators-
restrain-a-public-interest-push-on-poison-pills. 
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go since most bidders will either reach agreement with the target in 105 
days or abandon their takeover attempt (or not even make the attempt in the 
first place).109 Still, some practitioners add that there may be circumstances 
where regulators might allow a poison pill to remain past 105 days if a clear 
majority of shareholders voted to approve the plan while the bid was pend-
ing or perhaps where there is an eleventh-hour revelation justifying giving 
the target more time.110 In other words, the new regulations reemphasize the 
notion that Canadian law gives corporate boards the ability to “just say 
slow” rather than “just say no,” giving them leeway to maximize sharehold-
er value without stymieing the market for corporate control.111 
This resolves the longstanding discrepancy between the logic of the 
Canadian Supreme Court in 1976 Debentureholders, which broadly defined 
the fiduciary duties of directors (allowing them to consider long-term inter-
ests and affording a modicum of deference to their judgment), and the offi-
cial policies of the provincial securities regulators which, up until now, 
would essentially second guess any attempt to prevent shareholders from 
voting on a takeover bid. Under the new rules, the Neo, Pulse, Lions Gate, 
and Baffinland cases would never have occurred because directors would 
have had 105 days to negotiate a deal or seek renewal of the pill from 
shareholders—no need to litigate abstruse questions of fiduciary duty. 
From the perspective of the shareholder-primacy camp, these proposed 
rules are what they have always wanted, and roughly approximate what Jus-
tice Strine suggested should be a compromise position for the American 
system. The proposed rules involve a limited poison pill subject to share-
holder approval and allow for the target board to wage a proxy fight to 
“convince stockholders that they are better off if the bid is rejected.”112 By 
the same token, Bainbridge and Strine would probably both suffer mi-
graines at the thought that shareholders could vote at any time to rescind a 
pill, but that is the cost of compromise. While one might argue that this 
makes minority shareholders subject to the whims of an entrenched board, 
this is only true until the next annual board election or the expiry of the de-
posit period. 
There was one missed opportunity, however. The final amendments 
did not follow through on proposed amendments’ efforts to combat “empty 
 
 109 Canadian Securities Administrators, Proposed NI 62-105 Security Holder Rights Plans, supra 
note 65, at 2650. 
 110 Drew Hasselback, New Takeover Rules Limiting Poison Pills Will Make it Harder to Bring Hos-
tile Bids, NATIONAL POST: LEGAL POST (Mar. 1, 2016, 3:03 PM), 
http://business.financialpost.com/legal-post/new-takeover-rules-limiting-poison-pills-will-make-it-
harder-to-bring-hostile-bids. 
 111 Ruben Zaramian, Maximizing Shareholder Value Through Process: Canada’s New Take-Over 
Bid Rules, Mondaq, Mar. 9, 2016, Factiva, Doc. No., BBPUB00020160309ec39000y1. 
 112 See Strine, supra note 15, at 459–61. 
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voting” tactics that had so vexed Hu and Black.113 This is arguably a serious 
problem in Canada. For instance, TELUS Corporation (a giant Canadian 
telecom firm) was thwarted in its efforts to convert its non-voting shares in-
to voting shares because a New York hedge fund bought up a combination 
of shares and derivatives such that it could block the conversion and profit 
as the non-voting share price fell while not holding any actual economic in-
terest in TELUS.114 The proposed amendments included provisions count-
ing derivatives and “equity equivalent derivatives” for both mandatory vot-
ing and Early Warning Reporting thresholds, but the final rules did not 
include these changes.115 
Nevertheless, Canada’s proposed amendments allow boards to adopt 
poison pills and retain them for a useful period of time such that negotiating 
power is increased while shareholders retain their right to vote on a takeo-
ver transaction at auction should they so desire. 
 IV. THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 
 A. The American Legal Apparatus: Delaware Reigns Supreme 
State statutes and judicially crafted rules align to make the American 
system of takeover regulation so board-centric as to effectively deny share-
holders the right to vote on takeover transactions without board approval. 
This is because the American system of takeover regulation is informed 
primarily by state—Delaware—corporate law and SEC regulations. Direc-
tors’ duties of care are defined by state statute, but unlike in Canada, there 
is no regulator with wide-ranging “public interest jurisdiction” to step in 
and enforce that duty of care, let alone bring entrenched or corrupt man-
agement to heel on behalf of beleaguered shareholders. Instead, sharehold-
ers must file a formal suit in court, which almost always defers to manage-
 
 113 Canadian Securities Administrators, ONT. SEC. COMM’N, CSA Notice 62-307: Update on Pro-
posed Amendments to Multilateral Instrument 62-104 Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids, National Instru-
ment 62-103 Early Warning System and Related Take-Over Bid and Insider Reporting Issues and Na-
tional Policy 62-203 Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids (Oct. 10, 2013), 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category6/csa_20141010_62-307_proposed-
admendments-multilateral-instrument.pdf. 
 114 See Letter from Monique Mercier, TELUS Chief Legal Officer to the Ontario Securities Com-
mission and Autoritê des marchés financiers regarding CSA Request for Comment on Proposed Nation-
al Instrument 62-203 (July 7, 2013), http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category6-
Comments/com_20130702_62-203_teluscorp.pdf. Cf. Letter from James Trotter, Council of Institutional 
Investors, to the OSC and AMF regarding CSA Request for Comment on Proposed National Instrument 
62-203 (July 11, 2013), http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category6-
Comments/com_20130711_62-203_counselofii.pdf (claiming that empty voting poses no problem at all 
and that the CSA would be ill-advised to require the disclosure of derivatives). 
 115 McCarthy Tetrault LLP, Canada’s Early Warning Rules Get Tougher in May, MONDAQ, Mar. 9, 
2016, Factiva, Doc. No. BBPUB00020160309ec39000vv. 
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ment under the “business judgment rule.”116 Hence, state courts are not 
nearly as aggressive as Canada’s regulators have been. 
When the Delaware Chancery Courts confront a board’s decision to 
resist a hostile takeover, the business judgment rule remains a nearly im-
penetrable defense. The business judgment rule forms the basis of the Un-
ocal test which shields nearly any defensive tactic, including poison pills.117 
To prevent the invalidation of a defensive measure, the board of directors 
need only demonstrate that it “had reasonable grounds for believing that a 
danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed” and that its “defensive 
response was reasonable [and proportionate] in relation to the threat 
posed.”118 This deferential standard has a wrinkle in the form of Blasius In-
dustries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., where, “under very unusual facts” the Dela-
ware Supreme Court “held that the board of directors must provide a ‘com-
pelling justification’ for its actions where the board acted ‘for the primary 
purpose of interfering with the effectiveness of a stockholder vote.’”119 
However, Blasius has been subsequently interpreted to require that directors 
have the sole, specific intent to deprive shareholders of the right to vote on 
a takeover bid, which explains why nobody has successfully used Blasius to 
get a Delaware court to force the rescission of a shareholder rights plan.120 
Hence, Delaware courts and a supermajority of other state courts apply the 
Unocal standard, meaning poison pills can remain active indefinitely with-
out any need for shareholder approval until the next annual board election. 
Board entrenchment is made worse by the default allowance of classi-
fied boards under Delaware law, which makes it impossible for an acquirer 
to gain control of the board without going through two years of proxy 
fights.121 When Unocal and staggered boards are considered together, they 
 
 116 The business judgment rule defers to the “managerial prerogatives” of directors by creating a 
“presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed ba-
sis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”  
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on grounds not relevant here by Brehm v. 
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 255 (Del. 2000). 
 117 Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1993) (citing Unocal Corp. v. 
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985)). 
 118 Id. 
 119 Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. CIV.A. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *15 (Del. Ch. May 
2, 2014) (quoting Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch.1988)). The reader 
may be interested to know that Third Point involved the takeover of the venerable auction house Sothe-
by’s. For additional analysis, see Michael O’Bryan & Enrico Granata, Delaware Court Upholds Poison 
Pill in Response to Activist Accumulations, 25 WESTLAW J. M&A 1 (July 25, 2014) (discussing a two-
tier trigger shareholder rights plan and the limits of board discretion under Unocal). 
 120 See Michal Barzuza, The State of State Antitakeover Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 1973, 2015–17 (2009). 
Barzuza indicates that Michigan, Nevada, New York, and Massachusetts have used Blasius or some oth-
er enhanced fiduciary standard when striking down the more extreme versions of poison pills (i.e. “dead 
hand” pills, which can only be rescinded by those directors who implemented them). Id. 
 121 See DGCL, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (West 2014) (allowing boards of up to three classes). 
The effect of this provision of the DGCL is to elect the board like the United States Senate. Only a few 
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have the effect of allowing American boards to unilaterally implement poi-
son pills in the face of a takeover, and shareholders have no recourse absent 
a proxy fight.122 Unfortunately, the proxy fight itself is also a relatively in-
effective route for shareholders to use to attempt to rescind a pill since the 
target board has several ways to tilt the process in its favor including the 
ability to spend corporate funds on winning the board election. A prospec-
tive acquirer has no recourse in court against an unfairly rigged proxy fight 
unless success is “not realistically attainable.”123 This is tantamount to no 
recourse at all. 
Taken together, the American policies make hostile takeovers practi-
cally impossible, reducing shareholder value.124 Indeed, the burdens of 
completing a hostile takeover are so high that no hostile bidder has suc-
ceeded in a hostile takeover of a company with a staggered board and an ac-
tive shareholder rights plan since at least 1996!125 Plus, the litigation costs 
involved in a hostile takeover and the ensuing proxy fight make the Ameri-
can system of takeovers very expensive relative to its peer nations.126 This 
 
seats are up at any one time. Also like the U.S. Senate, under the DGCL, there can be a maximum of 
three classes of directors, so each class must be up for election once in three years. From the perspective 
of an acquirer, this is problematic because it means that he must win board elections two years in a row 
to gain control of the board and rescind the poison pill. Also, DGCL, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k)(1) 
(West 2014) sets as a default rule that unless the certificate of incorporation provides otherwise, direc-
tors on classified boards are removable only “for cause.” Under the Canada Business Corporations Act, 
R.S.C. 1985, c C-44 (“CBCA”), sec 109(1) (Can.), “the shareholders of a corporation may by ordinary 
resolution at a special meeting remove any director or directors from office.” Since CBCA § 2 defines 
“ordinary resolution” as a majority vote, all directors of businesses incorporated under the CBCA are 
subject to removal without cause by majority vote at any time. The total opposite of the Delaware de-
fault rules for Articles of Incorporation. 
 122 In states that follow Unocal, shareholders have been unable to use bylaw amendments to forbid 
board adoptions of poison pills, largely because boards can unilaterally amend bylaws. See MODEL BUS. 
CORP. ACT, § 10.05 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (West 2014). Oklahoma 
was the temporary exception. In 1999 its Supreme Court held that “under Oklahoma law there is no ex-
clusive authority granted boards of directors to create and implement shareholder rights plans” against 
the wishes of a majority of shareholders, but shareholders rights to “propose bylaws which restrict board 
implementation of shareholder rights plans” exist only if “the certificate of incorporation does not pro-
vide otherwise.” Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Companies, Inc., P.2d 907, 908 (Okla. 
1999). Unfortunately for shareholder rights advocates, the effect of this holding was easily evaded be-
cause every subsequently incorporated entity need only include a charter provision denying shareholders 
the right to enact pill-defeating bylaws. 
 123 Selectica, Inc. v. Versata Enters., Inc., 5 A.3d 586, 601 (Del. 2010). See also Paul H. Edelman & 
Randall S. Thomas, Selectica Resets the Trigger on the Poison Pill: Where Should the Delaware Courts 
Go Next?, 87 IND. L.J. 1087 (2012). 
 124 See Comment & Schwert, supra note 40, at 43; Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 39, at 415–17. 
 125  See R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSIE A. FINKELSTEIN, DEL. L. OF CORP. & BUS. ORG. § 4.6 (R. 
Franklin Balotti & Jesse A. Finkelstein eds. 2006); Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 39, at 413 (citing Lu-
cian A. Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 713–753 (2003)). 
This assumes that the corporation has three classes of directors on the board, the maximum allowable 
under Delaware corporate law. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2010). 
 126 See Armour et al., supra note 8, at 1749 (comparing American and British leading M&A law 
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state of affairs has all the effects that the law and economics academics 
warn of, including decreased firm economic performance and persistently 
incompetent management. 
 B. Curbing American Excess 
Adopting the Canadian rules would restore shareholder’s ability to 
have a meaningful say on takeover transactions while maintaining a board’s 
ability to resist coercive hostile takeovers indefinitely. Recall that the pro-
posed Canadian rule would allow boards unilateral discretion to adopt an 
SRP for 105 days and potentially longer with shareholder approval. If 
adopted in the American context, the rule would have positive effect by re-
empowering shareholders. Since shareholders need not control the board to 
rescind127 (American for “cease trade”) the poison pill, the acquirer can take 
up enough shares to make control all but certain in the next two elections.128 
A director faced with all but certain defeat in two years will probably see he 
is better served by a quick exit than remaining on the board of a company of 
which he is destined to lose—perhaps this might even make would-be hold-
outs more likely to work cooperatively with the acquirer in the first place.  
In addition, even though America does not benefit from the Canadian 
rules that make classified boards removable at any time by majority vote,129 
an outright ban on classified boards might not be necessary for the Canadi-
an 90-day rule to effectively allow for an acquirer to gain control of the 
board for most corporations. Institutional shareholders have taken signifi-
cant strides using ordinary shareholder voting procedures to amend corpo-
rate charters and bylaws to eliminate classified boards in large companies, 
reducing the number of S&P 500 companies with classified boards from 
303 to 126 between 1999 and 2012.130 Fifty-two more of the S&P 500 de-
 
firms to reveal the American lawyers generated more than double the revenue of their British counter-
parts). 
 127 This is American for “cease trade.” The technical distinction is that when a board rescinds a pill, 
it usually must pay the shareholders some nominal consideration in exchange for them surrendering their 
rights to buy shares. WILLIAM J. CARNEY, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 352 
(3d ed. 2011). However, when a Securities Commissioner “cease trades” the pill, the warrants simply 
cannot be exercised—no consideration changes hands. If shareholders use the Canadian Rule to “re-
scind” a pill, it is likely that no consideration will be paid since the shareholders are essentially waiving 
their rights under the plan. 
 128 This obviates the need to strain existing doctrine by treating a loss in a proxy contest as a refer-
endum on the pill. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful 
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 944–49 
(2002) (arguing that Delaware courts should interpret the “reasonableness” prong of the Unocal test such 
that a loss in a proxy contest should be sufficient grounds to rescind a pill over management’s objec-
tions). 
 129 See Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-44, secs 2, 109(1) (Can.) (providing 
that directors are removable by ordinary shareholder resolution which requires a mere majority vote). 
 130 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Scot Hirst & June Rhee, Towards the Declassification of S&P 500 Boards, 3 
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classified their boards in 2013, and twenty-four further companies agreed in 
2014 to use annual elections for all directors.131 In light of these advance-
ments, the shareholders in more American companies than ever would be 
able to use the Canadian rule exactly as designed—the tendering of shares 
would occur simultaneously with the change of control. 
One of the criticisms leveled at the Canadian rule was that it would in-
crease proxy fights and litigation surrounding them.132 While this may be 
true, it cannot be said that American firms would suffer any net increase in 
their legal bills by eliminating an entire subject of litigation. Even if there is 
an increase in litigation over proxy fights, at worst, the only dollars spent 
will be those that have otherwise been dedicated toward attacking or de-
fending the shareholder rights plan.133 Plus, any attempts at thwarting vot-
ing during the proxy fight might actually breathe a little vitality into the 
Blasius standard, and boards might discover that any attempt to restrict the 
shareholder franchise will be met with far less deference than their former 
attempts to implement or retain poison pills.134 
Adopting the Canadian rules would eliminate protracted court battles 
over the legality of various types of pills since they can be easily removed 
at the end of the deposit period—and if they cannot, it is only because the 
shareholders have said so. For instance, in AirGas it took sixteen months of 
trials and appeals for a Delaware Chancery court to determine that a poison 
pill could not be redeemed.135 The Canadian rule likely would have allowed 
a sufficient number PeopleSoft shareholders to vote to rescind the Peo-
pleSoft’s pill and tender their shares without having to endure an eight-
 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 157, 165 (2013) (citing Classified Boards Year Over Year, SHARKREPELLENT, 
http://sharkrepellent.net (last visited Feb. 1, 2013)). 
 131 121 Companies Agreed to Move Towards Annual Elections, HARV. SHAREHOLDER RTS. PROJ., 
http://srp.law.harvard.edu/companies-entering-into-agreements.shtml (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). 
 132 See Barry Critchley, Activism, Takeover Rules Can Co-Exist, NAT’L POST, Nov. 14, 2014, at 2, 
2014 WLNR 32018919. 
 133 The nature of the Canadian regulation also begets efficiency and cost effectiveness. Implement-
ing the 90-day brightline rule would require adjudicating the adequacy of adherence to an easily testable 
criterion, rather than nebulous musings on “public interest” or even “business judgment” standards. See 
Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 387–88 (1985) (arguing that brightline rules 
“reduce the cost of communicating” facilitating “communications and transactions”); Louis Kaplow, 
Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992) (noting that rules are more 
efficient and appropriate for situations where the conduct governed occurs frequently, as it will with the 
90-day rule). 
 134 See Carmody v. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d 1180, 1186–87 (Del. Ch. 1998) (discussing permissible and 
impermissible ways corporate boards might attempt to interfere with proxy contests). 
 135 Airgas, Inc. v. Air Products & Chemicals, Inc., No. CIV.A. 5817-CC, 2010 WL 3960599 (Del. 
Ch. Oct. 8, 2010), rev’d, 8 A.3d 1182, 1185 (Del. 2010); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 
A.3d 48, 57 (Del. Ch. 2011) (noting this was the most court time a poison pill case had received in Del-
aware history). See generally Steven M. Davidoff, A Case Study: Air Products v. Airgas and the Value 
of Strategic Judicial Decision-Making, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 502, 547 (2012). 
36_3_3 CARPENTER FINAL.docx (DO NOT  DELETE) 10/10/16  8:32 PM 
Medication in Moderation 
36:547 (2016) 
575 
een-month slog to the finish line.136 And the Canadian Rule would likely 
have allowed Circon shareholders to bypass a staggered board and poison 
pill to at least tender their shares to U.S. Surgical in 1996 rather than be 
forced to accept a deal for 17% less two years later.137 In each of these cas-
es, entrenched boards were holding out for unreasonably long periods of 
time while incurring substantial litigation and attorney fees. The Canadian 
Rule, with its simple 105-day limit, would do away with much of this 
deadweight.138 Of course, if the pill remained at the end of the 105-day pe-
riod, a judge (like the Canadian securities commission) would have to de-
termine whether the pill should stay or go, but after the board has had such 
a long time to find alternative transactions it will be much easier to assess 
whether the board is acting to maximize shareholder value or merely to en-
trench and enrich itself. 
The Canadian Rule also eliminates any possibility of “substantive co-
ercion.”139 Since shares cannot be tendered to acquirer under the rule for 
105 days, there is no risk shareholders will sell their shares lemming-like 
without exacting a control premium because the board has plenty of time to 
inform them of the facts and prevent an unjustified dash for the exits. By 
allowing corporate boards to adopt poison pills, the Canadian Rule also 
helps boards avoid the problem of divided economic and control rights in 
shares. Since the a poison pill can have triggering threshold140 (i.e., 5% of 
all outstanding shares) at a level so low as to prevent an acquirer from gain-
ing substantial control of the company, the pill can prevent an activist in-
vestor from gaining enough control to engage in arbitrage.141  
 
 136 See Paul R. La Monica, Finally, Oracle to Buy PeopleSoft, CNN/MONEY (Dec. 13, 2004, 12:53 
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2004/12/13/technology/oracle_peoplesoft/; David Bank, After 18-Month 
Battle, Oracle Finally Wins Over PeopleSoft, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 14, 2004, 12:01 AM),  
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB110293586982698273. 
 137 See Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, supra note 42, at 1033; U.S. 
Surgical’s Offer for Circon Becomes Hostile, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1996,  
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/08/17/business/us-surgical-s-offer-for-circon-becomes-hostile.html. 
 138 And if the shareholders felt like paying for a lengthier test of wills at the negotiating table, then 
they remain totally free to maintain the shareholder rights plan. 
 139 See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 n.17 (Del. 1990), citing 
with approval to Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for Defen-
sive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247, 267–68 (1989) (defin-
ing “substantive coercion” as “the risk that shareholders will mistakenly accept an underpriced offer 
because they disbelieve management’s representations of intrinsic value”). 
 140 If an acquirer buys more shares after reaching this level of ownership in the company, then 
shareholders either receive shares or the rights to purchase shares (in accordance with the terms of the 
rights plan). 
 141 Additionally, if the United States were to adopt the Canadian enhanced disclosure rules, that 
would have the added effect of thwarting arbitrageurs who exploit the ability to divide economic and 
control rights in shares. The United States does not currently require disclosure of these “hidden owner-
ship” interests, but the new Rule in Proposed National Instrument 62-103 would help eliminate this 
problem. See Michael C. Schouten, The Case for Mandatory Ownership Disclosure, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. 
& FIN. 127 (2010) (arguing for disclosure regulations to prevent abuse of “hidden ownership” and “emp-
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Given the foregoing, it seems it would be entirely beneficial for the 
United States or each of its states to adopt the new Canadian Rule regarding 
poison pills. 
 V. TAKEOVER REGULATION AND DEFENSES IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 
The defining feature of the United Kingdom’s system of takeover reg-
ulation is that it strongly favors acquirers and shareholders. This has led to 
concerns that the system does not give corporate boards sufficient leverage 
to maximize shareholder value. With minor changes, the Canadian pro-
posed rules could be adopted in the United Kingdom to increase board lev-
erage while maintaining shareholder primacy overall. 
 A. The British Public–Private Regulatory System 
For historical reasons, the takeover regime of the United Kingdom, 
when compared with the United States and Canada, favors shareholders to a 
much greater degree.142 This is mostly because it evolved out of the inter-
woven relationships of major financial institutions and institutional share-
holders, which coalesced around the formation of the Takeover Panel.143 
Not surprisingly, given who developed the system, the United Kingdom has 
“very few legal sanctions to control the manner in which [companies] are 
bought, sold, and dismembered.”144 
Generally speaking, listed public companies are subject to the over-
sight of The Takeover Panel, a public-private hybrid regulatory board. In 
this respect, the United Kingdom is much closer to Canada than the United 
States because British courts defer almost completely to the Panel as the 
designated tribunal.145 The Panel’s activities, in turn, are governed by The 
 
ty voting” interests); Jordan M. Barry, et al., On Derivatives Markets and Social Welfare, 99 VA. L. 
REV. 1103, 1156–59 (2013) (outlining the level of disclosure necessary to stop arbitrage). For a perspec-
tive on what levels of disclosure might be required to solve the hidden ownership problem throughout 
Europe, see Wolf-Georg Ringe, Hedge Funds and Risk Decoupling: The Empty Voting Problem in the 
European Union, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1027, 1087–99 (2013).  
 142 See Armour et al., supra note 8, at 1767–77 (2007) (explaining that the relatively high level of 
institutional share ownership early on in the U.K. allowed such investors to create a system of self-
regulation favoring their interests as shareholders and repel government attempts at regulation). 
 143 Id. 
 144 See NILUFER VON BISMARCK, CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM ¶ 22 (2013). 
 145 The High Court of Appeal observed that it could interfere with Takeover Panel decisions only “if 
there has been illegality (the panel has misdirected itself in law), irrationality (no reasonable panel could 
have reached such a decision) or procedural impropriety (failure by the panel to conform to the rules 
governing its own conduct or to basic rules of natural justice).” R v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers ex 
p Datafin [1987] 1 QB 817, 822 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
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City Code on Takeover and Mergers, which it promulgates and enforces.  
The Panel had been a completely private entity since its establishment 
in 1968, but Parliament clothed the Panel with de jure authority by statute 
in 2006, making it a privately administered public regulatory body—Panel 
members are either current or former practitioners and are selected by both 
the Panel and financial institutions.146 Section 804 of the Companies Act 
gives The Panel the extraordinarily broad authority to “do anything that it 
considers necessary or expedient for the purposes of, or in connection with, 
its functions,” including amending the Takeover Code at will.147 
Practitioners have quipped the Panel’s first rule is only “thou shalt do 
what thou ist told,”148 but any comparison to the Canadian securities admin-
istrators would be inapt. Though the Panel may regulate in any manner it 
desires by fiat, the Panel’s historical practice and current view is that it 
should not consider “wider questions of public interest” or exercise what 
Canadian regulators would call “public interest” jurisdiction.149 The Panel 
confines itself to ensuring the orderly acquisition and sale of companies 
while preventing target shareholders from undue prejudice.150 
The Panel’s self-defined role is embodied and effectuated through The 
Takeover Code,151 the animating principle of which is that all classes of the 
target company shareholders must receive equal treatment and adequate in-
formation to make an informed decision on the bid, and that the target’s 
management must act in the best interests of the company and cannot deny 
shareholders the right to accept or reject a bid.152 Most importantly for our 
 
 146 See The Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 763 (U.K.), Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on takeover bids (2004/25/EC), and the implementing Council Regulation (EC) No. 
139/2004; Panel Membership, THE TAKEOVER PANEL, 
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/structure/panel-membership (last visited Nov. 7, 2014) (explaining 
that the panel comprises thirty-five members of which twenty are selected by the Panel and of which 
eleven are selected by major institutions like the British Bankers Association and the Association of In-
vestment Companies). 
 147 It should be noted that any of the Panel’s rules can be waived at its discretion, but it will readily 
refuse waivers if any shareholders will be prejudiced, in accordance with General Principle 1 of the 
Code. 
 148 MCCLURE NAISMITH, CHRISTOPHER J. STENNING, & ANDREW G. WILLIAMSON, Securities Law 
in the U.K., in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 641 (Michael Best & Jean-Luc Soulier 
eds., 3d ed. 2010). There is substantial truth to this statement since all persons and entities under the 
jurisdiction of the Takeover Panel and the Takeover Code must comply with the Code in both letter and 
spirit, even in situations the code does not expressly cover. See VON BISMARCK, supra note 144, ¶ 652 
(2013). 
 149 See About the Panel, THE TAKEOVER PANEL, http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/structure (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2014). 
 150 Id. 
 151 THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE TAKEOVER CODE (2013) [hereinafter 
TAKEOVER CODE],  http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk (follow “Download Code as PDF” hyperlink). 
 152 See NAISMITH, supra 148, at 641. Additionally, the Panel forbids efforts to create “false markets 
. . . in the securities of the offeree company, of the offeror company or any other company concerned by 
the bid” to artificially cause a rise or fall in share prices. THE TAKEOVER CODE, Gen. Princ. 4. This 
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purposes, Rule 21.1 of the Takeover Code flatly forbids defensive 
measures—like poison pills—“during the course of an offer, or even before 
the date of the offer if the board of the [target] has reason to believe that a 
bona fide offer might be imminent, without the approval of the shareholders 
in general meeting.”153  
Rule 25 requires the target board to send a circular to its shareholders 
containing its views on “the offer and the [acquirer]’s plans for the compa-
ny and its employees” (along with impartial, independently prepared profit 
forecasts and asset valuations).154 Occasionally these disclosures and circu-
lars might be used as a defensive tactic, but their effectiveness is questiona-
ble.155 In light of the board’s dearth of defensive options, it logically fol-
lows that it has less leverage to ensure that shareholders get the maximum 
value for their shares, less time to make their case to the shareholders and 
search out value-enhancing alternative transactions.156 Since there are virtu-
 
serves to protect both the target and its shareholders. 
 153 TAKEOVER CODE, supra note 150, R. 21.1. Additionally, the “Duty to promote the success of the 
company” is codified in more general terms in The Companies Act, 2006, c. 2, § 172 (U.K.). See also 
Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd [1967] Ch. 254, 261 (holding directors could not issue shares for the sole pur-
pose of preventing a hostile takeover). 
 154 TAKEOVER CODE, supra note 150, R. 25. The only other known defense, aside from disseminat-
ing information to shareholders, is to coax another government entity or agency to initiate a judicial or 
administrative proceeding or investigation. See VON BISMARK, supra note 143, ¶¶ 767–70. In the case of 
Farmers Insurance, Farmers a subsidiary of B.A.T., lobbied U.S. state regulators to persuade them they 
had jurisdiction over the takeover launched against B.A.T. and that the takeover required their consent 
before it could be completed. Panel Statement 1989/20 (Sept. 15, 1989) re. B.A.T. Industries, at  1, 
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/1989-21.pdf. While this maneuver 
effectively delayed the deal for nearly a year, the Panel concluded it did not violate the Code. The key 
factor, however, was that the state regulators had taken the initiative to participate in reviewing the 
transaction. In another case earlier that year, however, the Panel held that a target firm violated the Code 
by engaging in impermissible defensive activities by suing under Section 7 of the Clayton Act to procure 
an injunction against the takeover. Panel Statement 1989/07 (May 9, 1989) re. Consolidated Gold Fields 
Plc., at 2, http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/1989-07.pdf. Even though 
Section 7 allowed private companies to bring suits to enforce the antitrust provisions of the Act, neither 
federal nor state officials had intervened to stop the transaction. Id. at 8–9. The Panel reasoned that the 
target alone was causing the delay by injunction, so it ordered the target firm “to discontinue its litiga-
tion forthwith, unless it is approved by shareholders.” Id. at 24. In other words, a government apparatus 
must intervene before the Panel will brook delay. 
 155 See Acting in the interests of the company as a whole, 3 PALMER’S COMPANY LAW 12.299.28 
(2015). The board of directors might be able to avoid contravening General Principle 3 and Rule 21 us-
ing such disclosures by arguing “that a particular bid is at a fair price but that it is not in the interests of 
the company as a whole.” Id. This strategy was employed by Manchester United, “when the board, con-
sistently with its duties under the Code, advised shareholders that the price offered by [acquirer] was 
fair, but also stated that the financing structure meant that it was not in the interests of the company.” Id. 
 156 That is not to say that the U.K. system does not treat shareholders fairly, only that it might not 
afford shareholders the most value per share in a takeover as would the U.S. or Canadian system. In-
deed, there are several shareholder protective provisions. For instance, Rule 9 requires an acquirer to 
make a cash or cash alternative offer if its interests in the target’s shares reach or exceed a 30% voting 
stake in the target; all shareholders must receive the highest price the acquirer paid for such shares in the 
last year. TAKEOVER CODE, supra note 150, R. 9. Additionally, “when interests in shares carrying 10% 
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ally no methods by which a U.K. firm may defend itself, particularly thorny 
situations can arise in tender offers. 
 B. Cadbury’s Takeover Reveals Cracks in the System 
Consider the takeover of Cadbury by Kraft Foods.157 In 2010, Kraft 
Foods acquired the iconic British confectionary company Cadbury, much to 
the dismay of the British public.158 To allay concerns that the acquisition 
would cause job losses in the United Kingdom, Kraft promised in its takeo-
ver proposal and in its testimony before the committee that it would keep 
open its factory in Somerdale.159 Kraft later reneged on this promise, to the 
outrage of the public and Westminster.160 The committee remonstrated 
Kraft’s “cynical ploy,” and then sought answers.161 Echoing concerns that 
have been raised by Hu and Canadian regulators, the committee opined 
“that the takeover of Cadbury by Kraft was ultimately decided by institu-
tional investors motivated by short-term profits rather than those investors 
who had the company’s long-term interests at heart.”162 The committee 
suggested that only direct intervention by either the government or the Pan-
el would be sufficient to overcome the problematic institutional shareholder 
 
or more of the voting rights of a class have been acquired by an offeror (i.e. a bidder) in the offer period 
and the previous twelve months, the offer must include a cash alternative for all shareholders of that 
class at the highest price paid by the offeror in that period. Id. at R. 11.  Further, if an offeror acquires 
for cash any interest in shares during the offer period, a cash alternative must be made  that price at 
least.” Id. Taken together with Rule 1, Rules 9 and 11 ensure all shareholders get the same deal regard-
less of when they sell their shares, but the rules do not ensure they get the best possible deal because 
they do not allow the board sufficient independent negotiating leverage. 
 157 BUSINESS, INNOVATION, AND SKILLS COMMITTEE, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND TAKEOVERS: 
THE TAKEOVER OF CADBURY BY KRAFT, 2009–10, H.C. 234 (U.K.) [hereinafter BIS COMMITTEE 
REPORT], http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmbis/234/234.pdf. 
 158 Rupert Steiner, 400 Cadbury’s workers sacked after Kraft confirms factory will close just ONE 
WEEK after U.S. firm promised to keep it open, DAILYMAIL.COM (London), Feb. 10, 2010, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1249728/Cadbury-sacks-400-workers-Kraft-breaks-promise-
shut-factory.html. Public outcry regarding the deal, particularly Kraft’s reneging on its promise to pro-
tect jobs, spurred MPs to haul Kraft executives before the Commons business select committee just two 
months after the merger deal closed. Zoe Wood, Kraft to shed 200 British jobs but denies breaching no-
cuts pledge to MPs, THEGUARDIAN.COM (London), Dec. 6, 2011, 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/dec/06/kraft-axes-200-uk-jobs. These losses mounted 
through 2011. Id. The discontent was heard all the way across the Atlantic, too. See Alistair MacDonald, 
Foreign Takeovers Take a Toll in U.K.—Kraft’s Acquisition of Cadbury Feeds Discontent That Nation 
Is Losing Locally Controlled Industries, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Jan. 27, 2010, at A11. 
 159 BIS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 157, ¶¶ 1–5. 
 160 Id. ¶¶ 19–20. One publication noted the takeover had “attracted an amazing amount of vitriol.” 
Peter Crush & Jonathan Chocqueel-Mangan, Heading for meltdown?, HUMAN RESOURCES, June 2010, 
at 26. 
 161 BIS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 157, ¶¶ 1–5. 
 162 Id. at 30. 
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behavior caused by short-term financial incentives.163 
UK Business Secretary Lord Mandelson echoed the Committee’s con-
cerns in a speech to business community leaders in early 2010.164 He noted 
that increased public ownership of shares through retirement accounts 
means average shareholders ignore corporate governance while fund man-
agers make all the decisions about buying and selling stocks.165 Like many 
academics, Lord Mandelson warned that fund managers’ “incentives may 
require them to deliver returns on short timeframes, even if they manage 
pensions for people whose key interest lies in the long term.”166 The Secre-
tary highlighted the risks posed by linking CEO compensation to short-term 
gains in share prices and making share price increases “a corporate strategy 
in itself.”167 In large part, Lord Mandelson argued that “rewarding clever 
readers of the market more than industrial innovation, quality management, 
or entrepreneurial skill” does not build companies in the manner that is best 
for Britain.168 The Business Secretary claimed that the 2006 Companies Act 
was designed “to encourage the right kind of long-termism among company 
directors,” and called for “an equivalent long-termism among company 
owners, especially institutional shareholders.”169 His recommendations in-
cluded raising the approval threshold for a change of control transaction to 
two-thirds of voting shares and imposing a duty of stewardship on fund 
managers requiring them to consider the long-term interests of the compa-
nies in which they have invested.170 
Surprisingly, the Government took no actions in response to the find-
ings by the Committee on Business, Innovation, and Skills or Lord Mandel-
son’s proposals. Instead, the Takeover Panel publicly censured Kraft,171 en-
hanced disclosure requirements, and created a “put up or shut up” rule.172 
 
 163 Id. at 30–31. 
 164 Lord Mandelson, Speech at the Annual Trade and Industry Dinner, Mansion House (Mar. 1, 
2010), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100304014526/http://www.bis.gov.uk/mansion-
house-speech. See also Tim Webb, Lord Mandelson Calls for Overhaul of Takeover Rules, GUARDIAN 
(Mar. 1, 2010, 5:30 PM),  http://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/mar/01/lord-mandelson-mansion-
house-keynote (reporting that “Business secretary says . . . that directors should act more like ‘stewards’ 
than ‘auctioneers.’”). 
 165 Id.  
 166 Id. This view is shared by many. See, e.g., Coffee & Darius, supra note 31, at 4; Allaire & Dau-
phin, supra note 32, at 6; Strine, supra note 15, at 455. 
 167 Lord Mandelson, Speech at the Annual Trade and Industry Dinner, Mansion House (Mar. 1, 
2010), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100304014526/http://www.bis.gov.uk/mansion-
house-speech.  
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Elizabeth Rigby & Brooke Masters, Kraft Given Food for Thought, FIN. TIMES (London), May 
27, 2010, at 18. 
 172 TAKEOVER CODE, supra note 151, R. 2.6. The “put up or shut up rule” embodied in Rule 2.4(b) 
requires a target corporation to name any acquirer with which is negotiating or that approaches it once 
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The Panel promulgated these new rules in late 2011. The Panel claimed the 
goal of the 2011 Amendments to the Takeover Code was to “increase the 
protection for offeree companies . . . against protracted ‘virtual bid’ peri-
ods” by requiring bidders to identify themselves when making their bid an-
nouncement and to declare their firm intention to make an offer within 
twenty-eight days of announcing their bid.173 The Panel also asserted that it 
was “strengthen[ing] the position of the offeree company by . . . clarifying 
that . . . boards are not limited in the factors that they may take into account 
in giving their opinion on an offer.”174 
In other words, the Panel touts the ability of the board to state its mind 
as protective, ignoring the reality that boards have little authority to defend 
themselves save sending shareholders urgently worded letters. Lord Man-
delson’s suggestions appear to have gone nowhere; the threshold for a 
change-of-control transaction remains stuck at fifty percent, rather than 
two-thirds. This means that despite the shareholder protections offered by 
the Takeover Code, the boards of British companies lack any real leverage 
to negotiate with acquirers, hostile or otherwise. Without the leverage of de-
fensive tactics, the board cannot induce a buyer to offer the appropriate 
price for control of the company.175 
In the more recent case of Eclairs Group Ltd, the UK Supreme Court 
confirmed that in the UK board neutrality is so paramount as to prevent a 
target board from attempting to thwart a corporate raider whose goal “was 
to depress the values of the [target’s] shares so as to enable [the raider] to 
buy other shares more cheaply” and seize control of the target’s subsidiary 
without paying full price.176 More specifically, Eclairs Group and its affili-
ate Glengary sought to purchase shares in JKX, but the raiders—in an effort 
to keep down the share price—did not disclose their arrangement to work 
together when the Board demanded information on the raiders’ holdings 
(lawfully under both statute and the articles of incorporation).177 Even 
 
the negotiations or approach are made public. After the negotiation or approach is publicly identified, 
the acquirer has 28 days to make a bid or it will have to wait six months before it can bid on the target 
again. See Steven D. Solomon, British Takeover Rules May Mean Quicker Pace but Fewer Bids, N.Y. 
TIMES DEALBOOK (Sept. 19, 2011 12:58 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/09/19/new-british-
rules-will-speed-up-the-pace-of-takeovers/ (explaining many of The Takeover Code 2011 amendments 
in general terms). As it turns out, the “put up or shut up rule” effectively prevents acquirers from dis-
rupting a potential target’s day-to-day business operations by making public statements or leaking de-
tails about the deal under negotiation. See Aaron Kirchfeld & Matthew Campbell, Bankers Chafe Under 
U.K. Takeover Rules, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2013-09-
04/bankers-chafe-under-u-k-takeover-rules-that-embolden-targets.html. 
 173 THE TAKEOVER PANEL, Review of the 2011 Amendments to the Takeover Code, at 1 (Nov. 26, 
2012), http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/2012-8.pdf. 
 174 Id. 
 175 See Strine, supra note 15, at 460. 
 176 Eclairs Group Ltd. v. JKX Oil & Gas Plc., [2015] UKSC 71, ¶ 25 (Can.). 
 177 Id. 
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though JKX’s directors had reason to believe the responses the raiders pro-
vided were inaccurate, the target subsequent decision to strip Eclairs Group 
from voting its shares was reversed by the UK Supreme Court because 
JKX’s board acted partly to thwart a takeover by the raiders.178 In other 
words, “the board neutrality policy effectively overrides the directors’ belief 
that they are acting in the best interests of shareholders.”179 This level of 
helplessness is unacceptable. 
Eclairs held 27.55% and Glengary held 11.45% of JKX’s shares, 
which aggregates to 39%. This exceeds the 30% mandatory bid threshold 
(under Rule 5.1) requiring acquirers like the raiders to put in a tender offer 
for all outstanding shares at a price equal to what the acquirers paid over the 
last year.180 By failing to disclose their plan Eclairs Group and Glengary 
purchased an unfairly inexpensive extra 9% stake in JKX that should have 
been purchased as part of a mandatory bid, yet UK law leaves no room for 
corporate boards to unilaterally thwart this kind of behavior with defensive 
tactics like a low-threshold shareholder rights plan. 
 C. The United Kingdom Should Adopt the Canadian Rule 
Adopting the Canadian Rule in the United Kingdom would be benefi-
cial because it would give boards much needed time to assemble other of-
fers and lobby shareholders while preventing acquirers and those acting in 
concert from engaging in fait accompli tactics. The bargaining position of 
the board would be reinforced. If the shareholders still like the takeover of-
fer after waiting 105 days, the Takeover Panel can rescind the pill unless 
the shareholders pre-approve its continuation in advance (or, if they want to 
hew closer to current UK law, terminate the pill immediately). This gives 
the target board more than the usual sixty days provided under Takeover 
Code Rule 31.6 to secure an alternative transaction, persuade shareholders 
that transaction is preferable, or persuade shareholders from tendering at all. 
Had it been in place during the Cadbury takeover, Cadbury’s board might 
have been in a better negotiating position such that it could have secured 
terms binding Kraft to its commitments to keep jobs in the United King-
dom. 
The Canadian rule would also help to encourage long-term investing 
and “patient but engaged ownership”181 that can benefit stakeholders and 
 
 178 Id. ¶¶ 41–43. 
 179 Sam Bagot, Staying Neutral – UK Supreme Court Re-emphasizes Primacy of Board Neutrality 
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22, 2016), http://www.clearymawatch.com/2016/03/staying-neutral-uk-supreme-court-re-emphasizes-
primacy-of-board-neutrality-when-battles-for-corporate-control-arise/. 
 180 Eclairs Group Ltd., [2015] UKSC 71, ¶ 25. 
 181 Lord Mandelson, Speech at the Annual Trade and Industry Dinner, Mansion House (Mar. 1, 
2010), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100304014526/http://www.bis.gov.uk/mansion-
36_3_3 CARPENTER FINAL.docx (DO NOT  DELETE) 10/10/16  8:32 PM 
Medication in Moderation 
36:547 (2016) 
583 
shareholders alike. Lord Mandelson argued that the duties imposed on di-
rectors by § 172 of the Companies Act of 2006 require “directors to consid-
er the best outcome for a company in the long term, considering the inter-
ests of all the stakeholders – employees, suppliers, and its brands and 
capabilities.”182 Lord Mandelson even acknowledged that “[g]etting a high-
er price in a takeover may not be a perfect proxy for [those interests].”183 
Still, without adopting the Canadian Rule allowing the board to adopt the 
most effective takeover defenses, § 172 offers hollow hope of increased ne-
gotiating power because the Takeover Code operates as a separate duty.184 
Rule 21 flatly forbids the board from taking any defensive action without 
shareholder approval.185 Authoritative practitioners attempting to reconcile 
Rule 21 with § 172 do not even consider the possibility of defensive tactics 
without shareholder authorization.186 If the panel were to adopt the Canadi-
an Rule, then Rule 21’s prohibition would be partially repealed, thereby al-
lowing directors the freedom under the Companies Act to seek the best out-
come for the company long-term (which is incidentally in their best 
interest). 
The Canadian Rule is not without its detractors. Jennifer Payne of Ox-
ford University argues that similar rules allowing only “original” share-
holders (shareholders who are neither the bidder nor its affiliates) the right 
to vote on change of control transaction are “undesirable.”187 Professor 
Payne suggests these rules must not be implemented in the United Kingdom 
because they “appear contrary to the principle of equality stated in the 
Takeover Directive and in General Principle 1 of the Takeover Code.”188 
General Principle 1 states that “[a]ll holders of the securities of an offeree 
company of the same class must be afforded equivalent treatment; moreo-
ver, if a person acquires control of a company, the other holders of securi-
ties must be protected.”189 
Equality among offeree-shareholders is primary concern of takeover 
regimes in the United States190 and Canada191 as well. The Canadian Rule 
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does not offend underlying policy rationale for General Principle 1 because 
allowing only original shareholders to vote on whether to rescind the share-
holder rights plan helps ensure that all shareholders get a better price if the 
company is sold. The Canadian Rule enhances the consideration paid to all 
shareholders for the control stake. Hence, the Canadian Rule actually fur-
thers the General Principles under the Code. Finally, reforming the United 
Kingdom’s takeover system would be very easy logistically.192 The Canadi-
an proposed rules could be adopted unilaterally by The Takeover Panel, tak-
ing advantage of existing institutional frameworks and knowledge while 
still allowing British shareholders to benefit from maximized value at the 
time of sale. At the same time, using the Canadian rule will not overtax the 
panel because, as was explained in the American context, the rule governs 
voting procedures which are easily administered. 
In mid-July 2016, UK Prime Minister Theresa May indicated in her 
first major policy speech plans to scrutinize foreign takeover bids to ensure 
they are in the national interest.193 Prime Minister May expressed unambig-
uous opposition to foreign acquisitions of strategically important British 
businesses and cited the takeover of Cadbury and near-takeover of Astra-
Zeneca as transactions her government would have blocked.194 However, 
when faced with the sale of British computer chip designer ARM to a Japa-
nese firm, both the PM and Chancellor Philip Hammond expressed their 
full support.195 Only time will tell whether May’s early pronouncements 
were mere posturing or whether a more formal public interest review pro-
cedure will be put in place. However, given the difficulties Canada experi-
enced with securities commissions exercising free-wheeling public interest 
discretion (albeit to facilitate rather than forestall takeover bids), it might be 
best to leave the target’s board and their shareholders in control.196 In other 
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words, if shareholders want to sell, let them, but give the boards of directors 
enough time to mount a viable defense if they believe it is in the best inter-
ests of the company and the shareholders in the long-run. Allowing for 
shareholder rights plans and a Canadian-style extended deposit period ac-
complishes this goal. 
 D. Schemes of Arrangement Unaffected by Canadian Rule 
The Canadian Rule is also advantageous because it cures the patholog-
ical weakness of corporate boards in the normal British takeover regime 
without causing additional problems for other methods of accomplishing 
takeovers. In addition to the traditional tender offer to shareholders most as-
sociated with the Takeover Panel, UK law provides another way for acquir-
ers to gain control of a company: the scheme of arrangement.197 A scheme 
is defined as a “compromise” or “arrangement” between a company and its 
creditors or shareholders (“members” in the language of the Act).198 At the 
very least, any arrangement must involve some minimal element of recipro-
cal concessions.199 
While initially used for reorganization of insolvent companies, 
schemes of arrangement are an increasingly common takeover method for 
widely held companies in the United Kingdom.200 To oversimplify, a 
scheme operates like a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. A creditor, shareholder, or 
the company proposes a scheme of reorganization in court, and then the 
creditors and shareholders vote in classes to approve the scheme.201 If 75% 
of a class votes to approve the scheme, the court compels the 25% minority 
to accept it.202 Then a court blesses the plan as fair and equitable, and all 
parties are bound by the agreement.203 
An advantage of a scheme of arrangement is that an acquirer needs to 
secure the votes of only 75% of each class to compel minority shareholders 
to sell their stakes, whereas squeeze-out mergers are available only when an 
acquirer has obtained 90% of the outstanding shares.204 While this makes it 
easier to gain 100% control of the target corporation when the takeover is 
friendly, a hostile takeover via a scheme is much more difficult because the 
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acquirer needs to obtain the votes of 75% of the voting shares. This is made 
even harder because the court will not count acquirer’s shares or those 
owned by entities affiliated with acquirer.205 Like the Canadian rule, only 
the “original” shareholders votes count, but the scheme requirements de-
mand not 50% approval but 75%. This means adopting the Canadian rule 
will not increase the number of takeover schemes compared to offers since 
the ability to rescind the poison pill makes it no easier to accomplish a 
scheme. Detractors of the Canadian rule cannot find support in any pretend-
ed effects on the scheme of arrangement mechanism. 
 VI. CONCLUSION 
Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom all have problems 
with their respective systems of regulating takeovers. In Canada, an over-
zealous application of public interest jurisdiction by regulators created un-
certainty and arguably began to impugn the will of shareholders by rescind-
ing SRPs and forcing votes on bids shareholders did not want to vote on. 
The Canadian solution resolved the problem by leaving the ultimate ques-
tion of whether the pill must go to shareholders. Both the American and 
British takeover schemes could benefit from the Canadian example. 
In the United States, state statutes and judicial precedent have made 
the American corporate board essentially an impenetrable fortress leaving 
shareholders and acquirers with nearly insurmountable barriers to rescind-
ing a poison pill. Adopting the Canadian rule would maintain the board’s 
negotiating flexibility while making them accountable to the true owners of 
the company. 
The United Kingdom has the exact opposite problem. British boards 
suffer from a lack of negotiating power and are unable to maximize share-
holder value to the same degree as their Canadian and American counter-
parts. Adopting the Canadian rule preserves share-holder primacy while 
giving directors needed leverage in a bidders market. 
In sum, three countries, three different problems, and Canada provides 
one elegant solution. 
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